Gerber v. Gerber : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Gerber v. Gerber : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
B. L. Dart; Kent M. Kasting; Dart, Adamson & Donovan; Attorney for Appellant.
David S. Dolowitz; Cohne, Rappaport, & Segal; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gerber v. Gerber, No. 950613 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6870
UTAH 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE Sjj$gp-^Ffs$TAiL 
• 0 0 O 0 0 -
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
Case No. 950613-CA 
Priority No. 15 
District Court Case No. 
924905415 
-ooOoo-
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY, ON JUNE 16, 1995 
AND AN ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SIGNED AND ENTERED 
ON AUGUST 15, 1995, BY THE HONORABLE SANDRA N. PUELLER 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, ESQ. (08 99) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
B.L. DART, ESQ. (818) 
KENT M. KASTING, ESQ. (1772! 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellee 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
Case No. 950613-CA 
Priority No. 15 
District Court Case No. 
924905415 
-00O00-
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY, ON JUNE 16, 1995 
AND AN ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SIGNED AND ENTERED 
ON AUGUST 15, 1995, BY THE HONORABLE SANDRA N. PUELLER 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, ESQ. (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
B.L. DART, ESQ. (818) 
KENT M. KASTING, ESQ. (1772) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 15 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 16 
ARGUMENT 18 
POINT I 18 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT REDUCING THE 
HUSBAND'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION BASED UPON THE WIFE'S 
FAILURE TO FULFILL HER OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DECREE TO 
SEEK AND OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT AT THE HIGHEST ECONOMIC LEVEL 
AND HER FAILURE TO USE HER BEST EFFORTS TO REHABILITATE 
HERSELF FROM HER DISABILITY TO ACHIEVE HER BEST 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
26 
THE WIFE, AT THE TIME OF TRIAL, WAS UNDEREMPLOYED AND 
THAT FACT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALIMONY AWARD IT MADE 
B 29 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT IMPUTING ADDITIONAL INCOME 
TO THE WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHAT WOULD BE AN 
APPROPRIATE ALIMONY AWARD UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
POINT II 30 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING THE HUSBAND'S 
MONTHLY ALIMONY OBLIGATION BY AT LEAST $1,357.00 PER 
MONTH - THE AMOUNT WHICH THE WIFE'S NET MONTHLY INCOME 
EXCEEDED HER NET MONTHLY EXPENSES 
i 
CONCLUSION 34 
APPENDIX 37 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
UTAH STATUTES CITED 
§78-2A-3 (2) (i) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1993) 1 
§78-45-75 Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1953) 22 
UTAH CASES CITED 
Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994) 33 
Cox v. Cox. 877 P.2d 1262 {Utah App. 1994) 24 
English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) 19 
Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah App. 1993) 24 
Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1994) 23,24 
Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) 21 
Thronson v. Thronson. 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991) 23 
Walters v.-Walters. 812 P. 2d 64 (Utah App. 1991) 18 
Watson v. Watson. 561 P2.d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1977) . . . . 19 
Willev v. Willev. 287 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, (Utah App. 1996) 18,25 
Willev v. Willev. 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . 21 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS CITED 
In re Marriage of Bukadk. 907 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1995) 25 
iii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to 
find that the wife was voluntarily underemployed for purposes of 
determining alimony? 
2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to 
impute additional income to the wife for purposes of determining 
alimony? 
3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making an 
award of alimony that exceeded the wife's reasonable needs after 
considering the wife's actual income? 
4) Were the trial court's findings in error related to the 
wife's actual income? 
5) Had there been a sufficient change in the wife's income 
and expenses to justify a reduction in the husband's alimony 
obligation?-
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-00O00-
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
Case No. 950613-CA 
Priority No. 15 
District Court Case No. 
924905415 
•00O00-
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY, ON JUNE 16, 1995 
AND AN ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SIGNED AND ENTERED BY 
THE HONORABLE SANDRA N. PUELLER ON AUGUST 15, 1995. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to the 
provisions of §78-2A-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1993). 
This action involves the Plaintiff's appeal from Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law and an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, 
entered by the Honorable Douglas J. Cornaby, on June 16, 1995, and 
an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Objections to 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, signed and 
entered by the Honorable Sandra N. Pueller, on August 15, 1995. A 
timely Notice of Appeal was filed on September 11, 1995. No cross 
appeal has been filed. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
There are no specific statutes or cases which are identifiable 
as determinative authority. As support for Appellant's position, 
see statutes and cases, cited in the Table of Cases, page iii, of 
this Brief, infra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case is a domestic relations case involving the husband's 
request for relief from alimony payments which he was making, 
pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered approximately one year 
earlier. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce 
were signed and entered on November 23, 1993 as a result of a 
settlement agreement reached by - the parties when the original 
matter was pre-tried before a domestic relations commissioner in 
June of 1993. That agreement was read into the record, reduced to 
writing, and ultimately incorporated into the Findings, Conclusions 
and Decree. 
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A material part of the parties' original settlement agreement 
provided for a review of the alimony award in one year, or such 
earlier time as requested by either party, based upon the wife's 
claimed disability related to her thumb and her resulting inability 
to work as a dental hygienist. 
On February 24, 1994, the husband filed a Petition to Modify 
the Decree of Divorce, requesting relief from the original alimony 
award. The wife had refused to undergo minor surgery to correct 
the problem with her thumb and had failed to obtain employment at 
the highest economic level possible as was agreed to under the 
original Settlement Agreement and ordered by the Decree. The wife 
responded to the husband's Petition, claiming that the alimony 
obligation should not be reduced. 
A one day trial was held on the Petition to Modify on November 
15, 1994. It was tried before the Honorable Douglas Cornaby, the 
judge assigned to handle the case for the Honorable Richard Moffat, 
the judge originally assigned to the case. At trial, both sides 
were represented by counsel, both parties testified and each called 
a physician to testify in support of their respective positions. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, and after hearing argument 
from counsel, Judge Cornaby ruled from the bench and 1) kept the 
husband's alimony obligation at $4,000 per month until December 1, 
1995; 2) reduced the alimony obligation from $4,000 to $3,500 per 
month from December 1, 1995 to December 1, 1996, at which time it 
was to be reduced by an additional $500 with that $3,000 per month 
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alimony obligation to then continue permanently; and 3) required 
each side to pay their own attorney's fees and costs. 
The husband then timely filed a Motion for New Trial and 
Objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
submitted by the wife. Judge Cornaby denied that Motion and an 
Order to that effect was signed and entered by the Honorable Sandra 
N. Pueller, (on behalf of Judge Cornaby) on August 15, 1995. The 
husband timely filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on 
September 11, 1995. No cross-appeal has been filed by the wife. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves the review of an initial alimony award as 
provided for under a Decree of Divorce, the terms of which resulted 
from a settlement agreement reached by the parties at the original 
pre-trial conference held in conjunction with the original divorce 
proceedings. (R-71) 
Paragraph 3 of the Decree provides as follows: 
Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the sum of 
$4,000 a month commencing with the month of July 1993, 
based upon the current financial circumstances of the 
parties as shown in their Financial Declarations and 
under circumstances where defendant is currently unable 
to work based upon her present physical disability. 
There shall be an automatic review of this alimony award in 
one year from the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
or earlier if circumstances warrant, based upon the 
anticipation that defendant will use her best efforts to seek 
and obtain employment at the highest economic level and will, further, use her best efforts to rehabilitate herself from her 
disability to help her achieve her best employment 
opportunities. 
The issue is reserved as to whether defendant's employment 
should be full or part-time based upon the needs of the 
children. At the time of the review, each party shall have 
the right to express his or her respective position on this 
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issue, as plaintiff's position is that defendant should seek 
and obtain full time employment and defendant;s position is 
that she should seek and obtain part time employment due to 
the children's needs. 
Plaintiff shall have the right to request defendant to obtain 
a physical examination by a hand expert currently, with a further examination six months from the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce and a second further examination one year from the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce to assist the Court in 
determining defendant's ability to obtain employment. 
At the time of the review by the Court, if there has been a 
substantial change in financial circumstances or ability, then 
the Court may make adjustments in the alimony award based upon 
those changes. (R-76) 
Other pertinent provisions of their agreement/the Decree, 
included: 
1) The husband was to pay $2,100 per month in child 
support for the support of the parties' three minor 
children, ages 15, 13 and 11. (R-77) 
2) The wife received the marital residence in Park City, 
Utah. (R-77) 
3) Both parties each received over $150,000 in cash. (R-77) 
4) Both parties received substantial IRA retirement funds. 
(R-77, 78) 
5) Each party was to pay their own attorney's fees. (R-79) 
At the time of the original divorce proceedings, the parties 
resided in Park City, Utah and the husband was a physician in 
private practice in Salt Lake City, specializing in cardiology. 
The wife was not employed but had worked extensively as a 
dental hygienist in the past. She claimed she was unable to work 
in that field at the time of the settlement because a few months 
earlier, she had broken her wrist and in the process injured a 
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tendon in her thumb. This, she claimed, caused an immobility in 
her hand and precluded her from pursuing her career in dental 
hygienics. 
In negotiating their agreement in relation to alimony, the 
wife's claimed disability was specifically addressed and the wife 
agreed to do her best to get back into the work force at the 
highest economic level possible, as soon as possible. That 
promise, on the part of the wife, was an integral and essential 
part of the husband's agreement to pay the wife alimony at the 
$4,000 per month level for the first one year. It was felt that 
this would give the wife enough time to have the surgery, recover 
and begin earning the $3,000 to $4,000 per month which dental 
hygienists regularly earn. 
After the Decree was entered, the wife did not seek employment 
in dental hygienics; did not seek corrective surgery for her 
hand/tendon7- and chose to work as a part-time substitute teacher 
for $5.67 per hour. 
Because of this inaction/action on the part of the wife and 
the accompanying financial hardship placed on the husband, he filed 
a Petition to Modify the original alimony award, requesting a 
reduction in the award at least commensurate with what the wife was 
capable of earning as a dental hygienist. 
After the Petition was filed, a one day trial was held in 
front of Judge Cornaby on November 15, 1994. 
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The testimony and documents presented by both parties at trial 
established the following facts, all of which have substantial 
bearing related to the issues raised on appeal. 
Dr. Gerber is 45 years old and in good health. He is a 
cardiologist and was self employed as a private practitioner in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R-3 02) While the original divorce 
proceedings were pending, he received an offer to practice 
cardiology in Florida at a salary of $200,000 per year. (R-246) 
The Financial Declaration, which he filed with the Court in the 
original divorce proceedings, reflected that $200,000 per year 
salary, ($16,660 per month gross) (R-57). This was the salary on 
which the original alimony and child support awards were calculated 
with the specific, express understanding that his wife would do 
what was necessary to improve or remedy the condition of her thumb 
so that she could pursue her profession as a dental hygienist. (R-
76) 
At the modification hearing, Dr. Gerber stated that the 
demands placed upon him by his new employer in Florida required him 
to work much harder than he had in the past. He works from 6:00 
a.m. to 7:00 p.m. every weekday, and he is required to work one 
night per week on call. He also works two weekends per month, from 
Friday at 7:00 a.m. to Sunday at 12:00 noon. (R-252) His average 
work day consists of 12 to 14 hours and he regularly works over 80 
hours per week. (R-253) Since his move to Florida, he has been 
required to work harder and spend more hours, or make less money. 
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He is currently only an employee of his Florida clinic. He is 
still in the three year probationary period of his employment 
contract with the clinic. (R-336) He has no stock ownership in 
the clinic (R-278) and is not participating in the clinic's pension 
plan. (R-278) His $200,000 per year salary places him in the 34% 
tax bracket. (R-337) 
Because of the additional time he spends at work, he incurs 
higher living expenses, and under his current circumstances, after 
he pays taxes and his child support obligation, he has little, if 
anything, to live on. (R-256; Ex P-l, P-2) He has had to use the 
savings which he was awarded in the original Decree to cover the 
shortfall. (R-256) He also used those savings to purchase a 2400 
square foot house in Florida and had to incur additional 
installment debt in order to acquire and furnish his new residence. 
(R-266 and P-2) His former wife and three children continue to 
reside in the 5700 square foot house in Park City, Utah. (R-257) 
Given his current economic circumstances, he is unable to put 
anything away for retirement or any monies away for the children's 
college education. (R-268) He indicated that he simply cannot 
continue to pay the $4,000 per month in alimony he originally 
agreed to pay and stated that amount was intended to be temporary 
and specifically conditioned upon his wife maximizing her earning 
potential within a year so that the amount of alimony could be 
reduced or perhaps eliminated. Following the reaching of the 
agreement, Dr. Gerber kept his part of the bargain and paid $2,100 
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per month in child support and $4,000 per month in alimony that had 
been agreed upon. (R-270) 
Ms. Gerber is in her early 40's and in good health but for a 
mobility probl em with her thumb. (R-17) She graduated from the 
University of Chicago at Loyola in 1975 with a Bachelor's of 
Science in Dental Hygienics. (R-367) She was certified as a 
dental hygienist in several states but allowed her license and 
certification to lapse. (R-369, 272) She acknowledged that the 
parties' original agreement contemplated her recertifying as a 
dental hygienist. (R-410) 
Ms. Gerber did nothing to attempt to recertify, as she had 
agreed to do, until after Dr. Gerber filed his Petition to Modify. 
(R-4 05) She then took the examination in June of 1994 and did not 
pass. (R-370) She received perfect scores on the written exam, 
patient presentation, and radiographic techniques, (R-407) but 
failed the-patient portion of the exam. She needed 70 points to 
pass and received only 68 points. (R-412, Ex. D-18) 
Since then, she has voluntarily elected not to take the test 
again, even though it is given at least bi-monthly at various 
locations throughout the western states. (R-405) She testified 
that she did not want to go out of state to take the exam because 
it took approximately 2 days and it would be "too traumatic" for 
her. (R-4 05) When questioned about her performance on the test, 
she stated that she did very well on the polishing portion of the 
exam but did not pass the scaling portion. (R-371) She said that 
she felt the reason she could not pass the scaling portion was that 
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it had been "so long since she had done that type of work". (R-
372, 373) She stated that taking the test again possibly could 
make a difference but said she was not capable of practicing for 
the exam because she "did not have a license". (R-373) She 
admitted that she could earn substantially more as a dental 
hygienist (R-3 74) and acknowledged it would amount to approximately 
$200 per day. (R-402) She said dental hygienists in the Salt Lake 
area were paid on the average of $25 per hour. (R-402) 
She described the problem with her hand as centered around 
mobility and tactility. "Tactility" means the ability to sense in 
the hand, the pressure being applied to the tooth or area around 
the tooth by the instrument. She then went on to say that mobility 
in her thumb was no longer a problem, inasmuch as she had been able 
to compensate by adjusting the position of her hand while working 
on patients, (R-374) but she still felt that there was a problem 
with sensi-tivity. Initially, she stated she did not believe an 
operation to the tendon in question would help, (R-3 74) but later 
admitted that such surgery help would remedy the problem. (R-3 74, 
3 75) She said that she had voluntarily elected not to undergo the 
surgery because she "did not want to be cut open again". (R-363) 
During cross examination, she changed her position and stated 
that while she believed she had a physical disability in June of 
1993, (R-404) she admitted that she no longer had the disability. 
(R-4 03) She again acknowledged that the parties' agreement related 
to alimony was tied to the problem with her thumb and her promise 
to rectify the same. (R-404) When asked if she was going to 
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recertify as soon as possible, she did not respond. (R-406) She 
admitted that she could get her mobility and tactility back if she 
practiced and estimated that that might take several months to two 
years, but said that with practice she would improve. (R-408) She 
further admitted that she did not attempt to apply again to 
recertify because she has been busy with the children, (R-411) but 
indicated recertification tests were given bi-monthly throughout 
the intermountain area. She further admitted that in order to 
recertify, she would not have to go back to school and did not have 
to get another degree. (R-412) She simply has to pass the test, 
a test which she came within two points in passing, the one and 
only time she took it. (R-412) On further cross examination, she 
stated that she simply did not want to go back into the field of 
dental hygiene. (R-412) 
During the hearing, the parties stipulated that if Ms. Gerber 
could work-as a dental hygienist, she could earn $1,000 per week 
and that work as a dental hygienist was available in the 
metropolitan Salt Lake area. (R-272-274) The trial court accepted 
that stipulation. (R-273) 
Instead of doing what she agreed to do under the original 
Agreement, Ms. Gerber took a job as a substitute teacher, working 
four days per week, at $45 per day. (R-376) This equates to $5.67 
per hour. (R-403) She said she was working 32 hours per week (R-
413) , and had Mondays off so that she could volunteer at the 
library. (R-387) She said she could work Mondays if necessary. 
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(R-413) She was working four full days a week at the time of trial. 
(R-4140] 
From the date of the Settlement Agreement until the time of 
trial, Ms. Gerber had submitted only one job application in a field 
related to dental hygiene and she was informed that job had been 
given to another applicant. (Ex. D-18) This occurred well after 
Dr. Gerber filed his Petition to Modify. 
Ms. Gerber then said that because of the children's extra-
curricular activities, she felt that she would be precluded from 
working full time, but was. in fact working 32 hours per week as a 
substitute teacher at the time of trial, (R-389) earning $780 per 
month. (R-377) 
She testified that her needs for the $4,000 per month alimony 
award and the $2,100 per month child support award had not changed 
since the parties' original agreement. (R-393) However, at the 
time of the agreement, she was earning no income and claimed that 
she had monthly expenses of $7,017. (R-390, Ex. D-21) She 
indicated that at the time the Petition for Modification was tried, 
her monthly expenses had decreased to the sum of $5,800. (R-3 92, 
Ex. D-20) On cross examination related to the $5,800 in expenses, 
she admitted that $600 per month was allocated towards payment of 
her attorney's fees; the health insurance premium of $186 was in 
fact $96; and that the $200 monthly computer expenses were related 
to the purchase of a computer and those payments would end in five 
months. (R-3 96) The total of those "extra" expenses amounted to 
$890. She further admitted that she had $71,000 (R-395) in non-
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retirement investment accounts and could use those monies to 
eliminate the $800 in monthly payments for attorney's fees and the 
computer. She also acknowledged that she had dividend and 
investment income of approximately $3,600 per year, or $300 per 
month. (R-401) 
In December of 1992, just prior to the parties' original 
settlement agreement, Ms. Gerber broke her wrist and as a result of 
that fracture, she experienced a tear in a tendon, which runs along 
the top of the thumb down to the wrist. That tear was sutured and 
some scar tissue developed around the torn, but repaired tendon. 
The resulting scar tissue caused a restriction of mobility to Ms. 
Gerber's thumb. Both parties called physicians to testify as to 
the nature of this problem and what could be done to correct it. 
Dr. Larry Leonard, Dr. Gerber's expert, testified that he was 
a specialist in reconstructive surgery and that his sub-specialty 
was hand surgery. He devoted 9-0% of his practice to that sub-
specialty. (R-344) He indicated that tendon repair, resulting in 
restricted motion was very common (R-346) and that such restricted 
mobility could be remedied by a surgery known as Tenolysis. It is 
an outpatient surgery, requiring a regional anesthetic block and 
involving at best, one hour of surgery, requiring a small incision 
to be made above the tendon, allowing entry into the affected area 
for the purpose of cutting away the scar tissue and freeing the 
tendon. (R-348) He indicated that there was a 90% chance of 
improving the mobility and a 50% chance of returning mobility to 
normal function. (R-350) He indicated he felt the risk of any 
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complications related to the surgery was 5%, (R-354) and that 
there would be no improvement of Ms. Gerber's condition without 
surgical intervention. (R-358) He concluded by indicating that in 
his opinion, if Ms. Gerber wanted to go to work as a dental 
hygienist, she should have the surgery so that complete mobility of 
her thumb could be restored. (R-361) 
Ms. Gerber called Dr. Boyd Cole, also a reconstructive 
surgeon, who indicated that approximately one half of his practice 
was devoted to hand surgery. (R-307) Dr. Cole said it was 
possible Ms. Gerber's condition might worsen as a result of the 
tenolysis surgery, but gave no percentages other than to conclude 
it was possible. (R-313) He acknowledged knowing Dr. Larry 
Leonard and considered him to be a good hand surgeon and a good 
diagnostician. (R-317) He also acknowledged that the problem 
could be remedied with tenolysis surgery which would be performed 
on an outpatient basis. (R-321 and 322) 
Ms. Gerber's testimony about her thumb disability was at best 
inconsistent and contradictory. When questioned by her counsel, 
she said she had elected not to have the surgery (R-363) . She said 
she did not believe the operation would help (R-3 74) but then 
immediately afterwards said it might help. (R-375) On cross 
examination she changed her testimony and said that she had 
compensated for the problem with her thumb and that "it was no 
longer a disability". (R-403) She went on to state that she felt 
she could get her mobility and tactility back if she practiced (R-
14 
4 08) but that she had concluded that she did not want to be a 
dental hygienist. (R-41) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Judge Cornaby issued his 
ruling from the bench which included a finding that he felt Ms. 
Gerber could be a dental hygienist. (R-455-456) Rather than 
imputing any additional income to her as a result of that finding, 
Judge Cornaby found that she should continue devoting time to the 
children's extra-curricular activities and that it was acceptable 
for her to continue substituting teaching at $780 per month instead 
of the $3,000 per month she could earn working the same amount of 
time (32 hours per week) as a dental hygienist. The court then, 
without further rationale, gave Dr. Gerber no relief from the 
$4,000 per month alimony award until December 1, 1995, at which 
time the Court directed that that award would be reduced to $3,500 
per month until December 1, 1996, with a further reduction of $500 
per month-to $3,000 per month thereafter, permanently. (R-449, 
450) 
Mr. Gerber's counsel prepared proposed Findings and 
Conclusions and an Order which Dr. Gerber objected to and moved for 
new trial. (R-120) Judge Cornaby overruled those objections and 
denied the Motion for New Trial. (R-149, 149 and R-176, 177) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The husband seeks the following relief in connection with his 
appeal of the trial court's decision. 
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1) That the decision of the trial court, related to the 
alimony awarded, be vacated. 
2) That this Court, pursuant to its equitable authority to 
review the evidence and facts presented at trial, impute a proper 
and fair amount of income to the wife, consistent with her 
education and earning abilities; and reduce the husband's alimony 
obligation to an amount deemed fair and appropriate by this Court. 
3) That in any event, the husband's alimony obligation be 
reduced to at least $2,500 per month, effective November, 1994, the 
date of trial, based upon the wife's actual income and expenses as 
presented by the wife at trial. 
4) For such other and further relief as might be appropriate 
and proper under the circumstances of this case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
When a spouse is voluntarily underemployed, it is both proper 
and required that the trial court impute a reasonable income to the 
underemployed spouse before fixing support obligations. This is 
true in cases involving child support and alimony and is applicable 
to both the paying and receiving spouse. The facts in this case 
clearly demonstrate that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily underemployed 
in terms of the amount of money she could make to contribute to her 
own support and the trial court erred in not so finding. As a 
result, the trial court also erred in not imputing the proper 
amount of income to Ms. Gerber and in not giving Dr. Gerber 
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immediate relief from the interim alimony award agreed to by the 
parties one and a half years earlier. That agreement was 
specifically premised on Ms. Gerber using her best efforts to 
secure the highest paying job possible. She failed to do that. 
The trial court arbitrarily disregarded Ms. Gerber's equitable and 
contractual obligations and as a result, treated Dr. Gerber 
unfairly in requiring him to make the ongoing alimony payments 
ordered. 
Point II 
The wife's own evidence demonstrated that her regular monthly 
living expenses were $890 less than what she claimed and her income 
from earnings and investments had increased from $0 to $1074 per 
month since the entry of the Decree. This substantial and material 
change in financial circumstances justified at least a $1,500 
reduction in husband's original $4,000 alimony obligation. The 
trial court-abused its discretion-in ignoring this evidence and not 
immediately reducing husband's alimony obligation. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN NOT REDUCING THE 
HUSBAND'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION BASED 
UPON THE WIFE'S FAILURE TO FULFILL 
HER OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DECREE TO 
SEEK AND OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT AT THE 
HIGHEST ECONOMIC LEVEL AND HER 
FAILURE TO USE HER BEST EFFORTS TO 
REHABILITATE HERSELF FROM HER 
DISABILITY TO HELP HER ACHIEVE HER 
BEST EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
In domestic relations cases, trial courts are afforded 
considerable discretion in fashioning property and support remedies 
fair to both parties. Walters v. Walters, 812 P. 2d 64 (Utah 
App.1991) 
A decision of a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it can be shown that the trial court abused its discretion 
and acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Walters. supra. 
In this case, the trial court did not treat Dr. Gerber fairly 
and the outcome which occurred was necessarily unjust to him. He 
now respectfully requests this Court to remedy that injustice so 
that he too, as a litigant, will be treated fairly. 
It is the prerogative of this Court to do exactly that and the 
facts in this case clearly justify such action. As was stated by 
Judge Davis, in the recent case of Willey v. Willev, 287 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 27, (Utah App. filed April 4, 1996). 
[W]e approached the problem here presented in 
full awareness of the standard rules which 
favor the Findings, Judgments and Decrees of 
the trial court, particularly in divorce 
matters. Not withstanding this, the right of 
review on appeal has its purposes . . . [This 
Court] would be remiss in its responsibility 
and this assured right of appeal would be 
meaningless if it unguestioningly accepted all 
actions of the trial court and remained 
insensitive to pleas to rectify inequity or 
injustice. Consequently, the rule is that 
when it is made to appear that the court has failed to correctly apply principles of law or 
equity . . . or that the judgment has failed 
to do equity, that it manifests a clear abuse 
of discretion, this Court on review will take 
appropriate corrective action in the interests 
of justice. (citing Watson v. Watson, 561 
P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1977) (footnotes 
omitted) 
The case presently before this Court is just the type of case 
about which Judge Davis was speaking. In considering the error of 
the trial court in this case, it is appropriate to review the cases 
in Utah which have dealt with the issue of alimony vis a vis' 
voluntary underemployment and the subsequent imputation of income 
to the underemployed spouse. 
In 1977, the Utah Supreme Court expressed its opinion on 
alimony and-its purpose in the case of English v. English, 565 P. 2d 
409 (Utah 1977) . In English, the trial court awarded the wife 
$2, 000/monthly as permanent alimony, in addition to $500 per month 
in child support for the parties' two teenage daughters. At the 
time, the wife was working part time as a home economist by choice. 
The wife presented evidence as to her needs which was less than the 
total income she was to receive from earnings and support payments. 
In reducing the alimony award from $2,000 to $1,000 per month, the 
Court addressed the underlying purpose of alimony and stated: 
There is a distinction between the division of 
assets accumulated during marriage, which 
should be distributed upon an equitable basis, 
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and the post- marital duty of support and 
maintenance. 
"The purpose of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife and not 
to inflict punitive damages on the 
husband. Alimony is not intended as 
a penalty against the husband nor a 
reward to the wife. . . " (ft) 
In Nace v. Nace, (ft) the court stated that 
the most important function of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during marriage, and to prevent the wife from 
becoming a public charge. The court observed 
that criteria considered in determining a 
reasonable award for support and maintenance 
include the financial conditions and needs of 
the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and the ability 
of the husband to provide support, (ft) 
In her testimony plaintiff could only 
substantiate a need for support in the amount 
of $1,500 per month for the entire family. 
She merely thought she should receive the 
greater amounts. Id. at 411, 412 (Footnotes 
omitted; Emphasis that of the Courts') 
Said -in another way, the English Court concluded that alimony 
was intended to financially assist the wife in meeting her 
reasonable expenses to the extent she was unable to do so after 
using her best efforts to support herself. 
Alimony has never been and should never be a vehicle to 
provide the wife with an annuity at the unjustified expense of the 
husband. Nor should an award of alimony be such that it creates on 
the part of the receiving spouse, a disincentive to work to the 
best of his/her abilities and ultimately become self supporting. 
In making an alimony award today, a trial court is duty bound 
to consider: 
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1) The financial condition and needs of the wife; 
2) The ability of the wife to produce sufficient income for 
herself; and 
3) The ability of the husband to provide support. [(Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); See also Willev 
v. Willev, 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 1993)] 
In the present case, the trial court erroneously focused its 
analysis entirely on the ability of the husband to pay and ignored 
the remaining two required considerations and the express terms of 
the parties' original agreement as was incorporated into the Decree 
of Divorce. 
Said in a more direct way, the underlying rationale of the 
trial court's decision was "Dr. Gerber makes a lot of money, 
therefore he can afford to pay a lot of money to his wife as 
alimony." Such an approach to an alimony analysis is wrong and not 
acceptable-. -
This point will focus on the trial court's failure to address 
Ms. Gerber's ability to produce sufficient income for herself and 
the fact that given the evidence which was before the court, a 
finding should have been made that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily under 
employed. Once that finding was made, the trial court should have 
then imputed income to her at the amount she acknowledged she was 
capable of making. Once that was done, the trial court could have 
then determined what alimony, if any, was appropriate after 
considering each parties' respective financial needs. 
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The trial court's failure to accurately determine Ms. Gerber's 
actual income and needs is dealt with in Point II of this Brief. 
The concepts of voluntary underemployment and imputation of 
income are not new to Utah domestic relations law. 
In a child support setting, §78-45-7.5 (Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
addresses the issue of imputation of income for purposes of 
determining a person's income and states: 
a) Income may not be imputed to a parent 
unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding 
made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed 
or underemployed. 
b) If income is imputed to a parent, the 
income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnincrs as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. . . 
* * * 
d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
i) the reasonable costs of chid care for the 
parent's minor children approach or equal the 
amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
ii) a parent is- physically or mentally disabled to 
the extent he cannot earn minimum wage; 
Hi) a parent is engaged in career or occupational 
training to establish basic job skills; or 
iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child 
require the custodial parent's presence in the 
home. Id. Emphasis added. 
While this statue is not di-rectly applicable to the issue 
before this Court, it does provide legislative guidelines as to the 
policy of Utah in relation to underemployment and imputation of 
income and specifies what should be examined when considering those 
issues. Likewise, the exceptions from imputation of income set 
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forth in the statute are designed to prevent an imputation when 
there is a real need which keeps a person from being employed to 
his fullest capacity. 
Not only are there legislative provisions providing for the 
imputation of income in child support cases, but also the courts of 
Utah have recognized and approved of imputation of income in 
connection with underemployment for purposes of alimony and child 
support awards in divorce actions. 
In Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), the 
wife, at the time of trial, was the primary caretaker of the 
parties' 8 year old child and a part-time pharmacist (before the 
child's birth the wife had been a full time pharmacist). Even 
though not employed full time, the trial court found the wife's 
earning capacity as a full time pharmacist to be $35,000 per year 
and used that sum in determining the alimony to be awarded. The 
imputed income finding was based on evidence reflecting a mid point 
of an annual gross salary range for pharmacists $31,000 to $39,000 
per year in income and assumed she was employed on a full time 
basis. The Utah Court of Appeals modified the term of the alimony 
award but upheld the amount of the imputation of income to the wife 
as an appropriate action for the trial court to take given her 
training and earning capacity. 
In Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 1994), this Court 
again approved of the trial court's imputation of income to the 
underemployed spouse. This case involved a child support dispute 
but its underlying principles have application to the case 
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presently before this Court. In upholding the trial court, Judge 
Greenwood, writing for the unanimous panel stated: 
However, the court may impute gross income if 
it has first examined a parent's historical 
and current earnings to determine that 
underemployment or overemployment exists. Id. 
§78-45-7.5(5) (c) , (6) . 
In this case, Mr. Hill did not stipulate to 
the amount imputed, and he argues the trial 
court did not make the required finding that 
he is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 1
 See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah 
App. 1993) (stating that in determining whether 
to impute income due to underemployment, findings must address "the critical question 
of whether the drop in earnings was 
voluntary"). IcL at 965-966. 
The issue of imputing income for purposes of alimony awards 
was also addressed in Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 1994) 
where this Court stated: 
"Imputing income to an unemployed or 
underemployed spouse when setting an alimony 
award is conceptually appropriate as part of 
the determination of that spouse's ability to 
produce a sufficient income." Willey, 866 P.2d 
at 554. However, a court should not impute 
income for child or spousal support until it first determines, "as a threshold matter, that 
income should be imputed because the [spouse] 
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." 
Hall, 858 P.2d at 1024. Id. at 1267. 
It is important to note that the voluntary unemployment/ 
imputation of income concept does not nor should not make a 
distinction between a requesting -spouse versus a paying spouse. 
Rather, the analysis should focus on each spouses7 ability to 
produce sufficient income for herself [himself] Jones supra. 
Financial assistance from the other spouse should be ordered only 
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when the requesting spouse demonstrates in good faith that he/she 
is not capable of completely supporting himself/herself. 
The Montana Supreme Court recently addressed a case with facts 
somewhat similar to the facts of this case however the genders of 
the paying/receiving spouses were reversed. In In Re Marriage of 
Bukadk, 907 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1995), the wife was a physician. The 
husband remained at home and served as the homemaker and cared for 
the parties' four children. In a subsequent divorce proceeding, 
the Court ultimately made an award of maintenance which the husband 
on appeal claimed was inadequate and based upon gender bias. In 
rejecting that claim, the Montana Supreme Court stated: 
Ed's claim of gender bias is also unsupported. 
The court awarded maintenance in the sum of 
$500 per month for one year, even though it 
expressed concerns that Ed had failed to take 
advantage of educational opportunities 
throughout his marriage and that Ed's 
unemployment at the time of the trial was not 
wholly unintentional. In addition, the record 
is clear that the court imputed income to Ed 
not on the basis of his gender but because Ed 
was capable of employment but had chosen to forsake several opportunities to be available full-time for his children. It is clear that 
gender was not the basis for the court's 
maintenance decision. Id at 937 
Finally, in the recent case of Willey v. Willev, supra this 
Court affirmed the imputation of full time income to a wife who was 
working a part time job for which there were not full time 
positions available and further affirmed the trial court's implicit 
finding that the wife was voluntarily underemployed. Id. at 28 
When all of the judicial/legislative pronouncements on this 
issue are condensed into a basic understandable equitable 
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principle, that principle should be; "Each spouse should act in 
good faith to maximize their respective earnings as quickly as 
possible after a divorce so that the requesting party will be as 
little a burden on the paying party as possible, and that the 
paying party will in good faith assist the requesting party with 
any real (not inflated) financial short fall." 
Equity is not achieved by requiring one party to have two jobs 
or work unreasonably long hours so as to enable the other party to 
work part time and/or earn less than he/she is capable of earning 
unless there is an extremely good justification for doing so. No 
such justification exists in this case. 
A 
THE WIFE, AT THE TIME OF TRIAL, WAS 
UNDEREMPLOYED AND THAT FACT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALIMONY 
AWARD IT MADE 
The evidence which was presented to the trial court required 
it to make a finding that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily under employed 
and the trial court abused its discretion in not so finding. 
More particularly, Ms. Gerber: 
1) Was 43 years old (ExD-20) 
2) Had three (3) children, ages 15, 13 and 11 all of whom 
were healthy and had no special needs. 
3) Had a degree in Dental Hygiene from the University of 
Chicago. (R-367) 
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4) Worked 32 hours per week at $5.67 per hour as a 
substitute teacher. (R-403, 413) 
5) Could work as a Dental Hygienist for $25.00 per hour 
after becoming relicensed. (R-402) 
6) Applied only once to recertify and take the test, failing 
by only 2 points. (R-370, 412) 
7) Said the tests were given bi-monthly in various regional 
locations but did not want to take it again because it was "too 
traumatic". (R-405, 411) 
8) Said she was no longer disabled. (R-403) 
9) Applied for only one other job in the field of dental 
hygiene, and that was after Dr. Gerber's Petition to modify was 
filed. (R-375) 
10) Acknowledged that jobs were available in the field of 
dental hygiene. (R-274) 
11) Agreed that she could make $3,000 to $4,000 per month 
working 32 to 40 hours per week as a dental hygienist. (R-402) 
12) Said she now had concluded that she did not want to be a 
dental hygienist. (R-412) 
13) Acknowledged that the original Settlement Agreement was 
premised upon her returning to the field of dental hygiene after 
she had time to correct the problem with her thumb. (R-410) 
14) Said she did not know want to have the minor surgery to 
correct the mobility problem with her thumb. (R-3 63) 
In spite of all of this undisputed evidence, the trial court 
simply missed the point and focused not on the fact that this 
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trained and college educated woman was, by choice, earning a little 
more than minimum wage, but rather on the extra curricular time she 
claimed she needed to spend with the children transporting them to 
and from their non-school activities. 
Even taking those activities into account, the court found 
that her working 32 hours per week still allowed her to do what she 
said she had to do in connection with the children's 
extracurricular activities. (paragraph 16, Findings, R-156, 157) 
It is clear that the trial court misunderstood the concept of 
"voluntary underemployment" and considered only one of the two 
criteria which must be looked at, (i.e., 1) the amount of time an 
individual can work and, 2) the amount of money an individual can 
earn given that individual's qualifications and job availability.) 
It was latter criteria that the trial court simply ignored and 
which should have been considered in depth, especially in light of 
the parties' earlier agreement upon which the initial alimony 
payment was based. Ms. Gerber had agreed to use her best efforts 
to maximize her earning potential so that the heavy financial 
burden on Dr. Gerber of the initial alimony award could be reduced 
as soon as possible. 
The evidence before the trial court unequivocally showed that 
Ms. Gerber had not kept her part of the original bargain and that 
would be acceptable so long as Dr. Gerber is not unfairly penalized 
because of Ms. Gerber's voluntary decisions regarding what she 
wants to do; what she wants to be paid; and what number of hours 
she wants to work. 
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B 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
IMPUTING ADDITIONAL INCOME TO THE 
WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING 
WHAT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE ALIMONY 
AWARD UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
It was incorrect for the trial court not to make a specific 
finding that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily underemployed. It has been 
demonstrated that she was. Once a determination of voluntary 
underemployment is made, the trial court is required to impute an 
appropriate amount of income to the underemployed spouse before so 
that the proper incomes of both of the parties can be considered in 
connection with the alimony analysis. 
By not imputing income to Ms. Gerber, as was supported by the 
evidence, the trial court's decision regarding alimony was 
erroneous, patently unfair to Dr. Gerber and fatally defective. 
The parties stipulated that a dental hygienist could earn $25 
per hour or $3,000 to $4,000 per month working a 32 to 40 hour 
week. (R-272) They also stipulated that work in the field of 
dental hygiene was available in Salt Lake and the general Wasatch 
Front area. (R-274). Ms. Gerber said she was no longer disabled 
so as to preclude her from working as a dental hygienist even 
without the surgery which Dr. Leonard had recommended (R-4 03). Ms. 
Gerber said the only thing preventing her from so working was the 
lack of a license which could be secured upon her successful 
completion of the recertif ication test (R-373) , a test she took 
only once and failed by only two points; (R-412) a test which is 
given throughout the intermountain region every two months; (R-411) 
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a test she said she did not want to take again; (R-412) a test she 
felt she could pass if she only practiced a little. (R-373) 
Ms. Gerber's position of not doing what was necessary to 
maximize her earning potential, while demanding that the $4,000 per 
month alimony payments continue, placed an unjust financial burden 
on Dr. Gerber and left him with no alternative other than to 
request the Court to impute income to Ms. Gerber and reduce his 
alimony obligation commensurately. Dr. Gerber asked Judge Cornaby 
to give him some financial relief and the Judge unjustifiably 
refused to do so in spite of substantial uncontradicted evidence 
demonstrating that Ms. Gerber was voluntarily underemployed and 
capable of earning $3,000 - $4,000 per month if she had really 
wanted to. 
Based upon the evidence in the record and the authority of 
this Court to not only review but make its own factual findings 
from the evidence in the record, -Dr. Gerber would request that the 
trial court's findings be modified so as to impute income to Ms. 
Gerber in the amount of at least $3,000 per month and that the 
alimony determination made by the trial be reduced accordingly. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
REDUCING THE HUSBAND'S MONTHLY 
ALIMONY OBLIGATION BY AT LEAST 
$1,363.00 PER MONTH - THE AMOUNT 
WHICH THE WIFE'S NET MONTHLY INCOME 
EXCEEDED HER NET MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Assuming only for the sake of argument that Ms. Gerber was not 
voluntarily underemployed and should not have additional income 
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imputed to her, the trial court still committed reversible error by 
ignoring undisputed income and expense evidence which justified a 
reduction of the husband's alimony obligation by at least $1,363 
per month. 
The following facts were undisputed: 
1) Dr. Gerber's monthly income was the same both at the time 
of the Decree and the modification hearing. (R-246, Ex D-10) 
2) Ms. Gerber's monthly income at the time of the Decree was 
$6,100 per month ($4,000/month alimony and $2,100 per month child 
support). (Ex D-21) 
3) Ms. Gerber's monthly expenses at the time of the Decree 
were $7,017. (Ex D-21) 
4) At the time of the modification hearing, Ms. Gerber's 
monthly income had increased to $7,180 [alimony $4,000; child 
support $2,100; earnings from teaching $774 (R-377); earnings from 
investments-$300]. (R-401) 
5) At the time of the modification hearing, Ms. Gerber's 
monthly expenses were $5,817 (Ex D-21) In addition, she also 
admitted that $890 of those monthly expenses were not really 
regular monthly expenses. (i.e. the $186 in health insurance was 
really only $96; the $200 per month in computer expenses had only 
5 payments left; and the $600 per month in attorney's fees) (R-
396). She had over $71,000 in savings which could be used to pay 
off these bills if necessary. (R-397) The trial court failed to 
accurately calculate and consider what financial change had 
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actually occurred. If it had done so, the following would have 
immediately become apparent: 
Ms. Gerber7s Monthly Income And Expense Comparison 
Income/Date 
Alimony 
Child Support 
Wages 
Investment Income 
Total 
Income/Date 
of Decree 
$4000 
2100 
0 
0 
of Modification 
$4000 
2100 
700 
300 
$6100 $7180 
Monthly Expenses 
Date of Decree 
$7017 
Monthly Expenses 
Date of Modification 
$5817 
Less : 
1) Overstated 
health insurance 
premiums 
2) Attorney's fee 
payment 
3) Computer payment 
Wife's adjusted monthly 
expenses date of 
modification 
( 961 
(600) 
(200) 
(890) 
$4921 
Difference between income and expenses without adjustment 
$7,180 minus $5,817 = $1,363 excess 
Difference between income and expenses with adjustment 
$7,174 minus $4,912 = $2,260 excess 
This undisputed evidence demonstrates that at the time of the 
modification Ms. Gerber was receiving at least $1,363 more per 
month in income than was needed to meet the regular monthly 
expenses she claimed she was incurring. When that occurs, the 
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trial court is obligated to make an alimony award that does not 
exceed Ms. Berger's actual net needs, Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P. 2d 
1065, (Utah App. 1994) 
In this case, Ms. Gerber's evidence demonstrated that she did 
not have the financial needs to justify continuation of the $4,000 
per month alimony award and the trial court simply elected to 
ignore that evidence in denying husband's request to immediately 
reduce the monthly award by at least $1,000. Such action 
constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
This error is further amplified and becomes more egregious 
when considered in conjunction with the fact that Ms. Gerber was 
underemployed and could have been earning $24,000 to $36,000 per 
year instead of the $8,400 she was earning as a substitute teacher. 
Further, the trial court's own findings on the issue of Ms. 
Gerber's income and expenses are clearly erroneous and not 
supported by the evidence presented. 
Findings of Fact 
6. The Defendant submitted a Financial 
Declaration in June of 1993, stating she had 
no income and filed a Financial Declaration in 
August of 1994, declaring an income of $244.41 
per month from substitute teaching. This, she 
testified, had increased to $300.00 per month 
at the time of trial. 
7. In June of 1993 the Plaintiff 
claimed living expenses of $7,011.00 per month for herself and the minor children of the 
parties. In August of 1994, the Defendant 
claimed living expenses of $5,817.00 per month for herself and the minor children with 
reservations of several anticipated capital 
expenditures. 
33 
8. The court finds no substantial 
change in the financial status or 
circumstances of the Defendant between the 
time of the agreement of the parties and the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce and the trial 
of this matter on November 15, 1994. (R-153, 
154) 
Finding of Fact 6 is simply wrong. Defendant's Financial 
Declaration dated August 9, 1994 (Ex D-20) stated she earned 
$244.41 per month working part time. At trial, Defendant testified 
she was making $5.67 per hour and working 32 hours per week. (R-
402), which she said equated to $700 per month in income, not the 
$300 per month found by the trial court. 
Likewise, Finding of Fact 8 is clearly erroneous regarding its 
conclusion that a $474 per month increase in income and $1,200 per 
month reduction in monthly living expenses were not a material 
change in circumstances justifying significant relief from the 
alimony award then in effect. Under no stretch of the imagination 
can a conclusion be reached £hat this change in financial 
circumstances was not substantial enough to justify an immediate 
and significant reduction in Dr. Gerber's alimony obligation. 
It was inequitable and arbitrary for the trial court not to 
have immediately reduced husband's alimony obligation to wife by at 
least $1,363 per month, based upon Ms. Gerber's own evidence and 
testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
In today's world, divorce is an unfortunate reality that 
necessarily carries with it adverse financial ramifications to the 
34 
individuals involved. Both parties have responsibilities towards 
one another to act in good faith in an attempt to reduce, as much 
as possible, the financial impact concomitant with a termination of 
their marriage. 
In this case, Dr. Gerber fulfilled the responsibilities he 
agreed to undertake when the parties settled their case one and one 
half years earlier. He paid the support monies agreed to and had 
to work 8 0 hour weeks in order to do so. 
On the other hand, Mrs. Gerber did not fulfill her 
responsibilities to use her best efforts to minimize the financial 
impact of this divorce and did not keep her part of the bargain 
which required her to use her best efforts to secure the highest 
paying job possible. What she may want to do with her life in 
terms of her future employment is basically up to her. But when 
she voluntarily makes a decision to not work to full capacity, Dr. 
Gerber should not be required to-continue to contribute monies in 
order to make up the differences created by her decision to pursue 
other less financially rewarding endeavors. 
The job of the trial court was to do equity based upon the 
evidence presented. That evidence undeniably and unequivocally 
demonstrated that Ms. Gerber did not do what she had earlier agreed 
to do under the parties' original agreement. The trial court 
arbitrarily chose to ignore that fact and in so doing failed to 
give Dr. Gerber the financial relief he was entitled to receive. 
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It is the job of this Court to rectify this substantial 
inequity and miscarriage of justice and Dr. Gerber respectfully 
requests this Court to do so. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of May, 1996. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Bv: / L^"* ~\. 
Kefit M. Kastin|j, of Counsel 
Attorney for Plaintiff/AppeTlant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a representative of Dart, Adamson & Donovan, 
hereby certifies that two (2) true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Brief of Appellant to David S. Dolowitz, dated 
May 20, 1996, was hand delivered to the following counsel of 
record: 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Kent M. Kasting, co-counseJ 
for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOOooo 
LOWELL GERBER, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924905415DA 
v. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant. Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
Hon. Michael S. Evans 
oooOOOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for pretrial 
on the 23rd day of June, 1993, before Michael S. Evans, plaintiff 
appearing in person and by his attorney B. L. Dart, and defendant 
appearing in person and by her attorney David S. Dolowitz, and the 
parties having reached a stipulation settling all outstanding 
issues in this divorce action, and the parties having stipulated 
that each of the parties could be awarded a divorce one from the 
other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the Court 
having considered the terms of the stipulation and finding them 
reasonable and the Court having made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Each of the parties is entitled to and is hereby 
awarded a Decree of Divorce one from the other on the grounds of 
r- r\ r «r% '** i 
ft f. ft ', • j <-' 
irreconcilable differences, which Decree shall be final upon 
signing and entry. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant have three children as issue 
of this marriage, to wit: Rebecca, age 13; David, age 11 and 
Jonathan, age 9. Defendant is awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of these children, subject to plaintiff's rights of 
visitation as follows: 
a. One half of summer vacation, including the 
right to have any one or two children for a separate one-week 
period as part of his half summer with each child. Plaintiff shall 
provide defendant with at least two months notice of when he 
chooses to exercise his summer visitation. 
b. Plaintiff shall have the right to have the 
children for one-half the Christmas break, with Christmas Eve and 
Christmas Day being alternated between plaintiff and defendant. 
Plaintiff shall have the children for Christmas Eve and Christmas 
Day and half the Christmas break in even-numbered years and 
defendant shall have the children for Christmas Eve and Christmas 
Day in odd-numbered years. 
c. Plaintiff shall have the right to visit with 
the children anytime he is in Utah upon providing to plaintiff as 
much advance notice as he has of his trip to Utah. In the event 
the notice is less than 24 hours, plaintiff would respect any other 
scheduled activities the children have. 
d. One half of holidays, to be alternated between 
the parties. 
e. A weekend for each child within the week or two 
of that child's birthday. 
3. Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the 
sum of $4,000 a month commencing with the month of July, 1993, 
based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties as 
shown in their Financial Declarations and under circumstances where 
defendant is currently unable to work based upon her present 
physical disability. 
There shall be an automatic review of this alimony 
award in one year from the date of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, or earlier if circumstances warrant, based upon the 
anticipation that defendant will use her best efforts to seek and 
obtain employment at the highest economic level and will, further, 
use her best efforts to rehabilitate herself from her disability to 
help her achieve her best employment opportunities. 
The issue is reserved as to whether defendant's 
employment should be full or part-time based upon the needs of the 
children. At the time of the review, each party shall have the 
right to express his or her respective possition on this issue, as 
plaintiff's position is that defendant should seek and obtain full-
time employment and defendant's position is that she should seek 
and obtain part-time employment due to the children's needs. 
Plaintiff shall have the right to request defendant 
to obtain a physical examination by a hand expert currently, with 
a further examination six months from the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce and a second further examination one year from the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce to assist the Court in determining 
defendant's ability to obtain employment. 
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At the time of the review by the Court, if there has 
been a substantial change in financial circumstances or ability, 
then the Court may make adjustments in the alimony award based upon 
those changes. 
4. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to plaintiff as child 
support for the three minor children of the parties the sum of 
$2,100 per month commencing with the month of July, 1993. 
Plaintiff is further ordered to provide health and accident 
insurance and be responsible for one-half of all non-insured 
medical, dental and orthodontia and reasonable counseling expenses 
which may be incurred for the children. Plaintiff is also ordered 
to be responsible for one-half of work related day care expenses 
incurred by defendant in her employment. 
Defendant shall be entitled to have the children as 
her exemptions for tax purposes. 
At such time as there is a reduction from three 
children to two minor children at home, plaintiff1s obligation 
shall automatically be reduced to $1,400 a month for two minor 
children and $825 a month for one minor child. 
5. The property of the parties shall be divided as 
follows: 
Mary Jo Lowell 
Park City home equity 
Bear Lake lot 
New Orleans condo 
Household furniture 
$176,000 
10,000 
14,334 
10,000 
5,940 
A-A t" 0 0 »» , ' 
Vehicles: 
1993 Ford Aerostar 20,000 
1992 Mitsubishi Diamante 22,000 
1983 Porsche - 0 -
Merrill Lynch accounts: 
CMA #587-29077 $197,171 (9/24/93) 139,814 57,357 
WCMA #330-97271 (9/30/93) 77,259 
IRA #587-83743 (9/24/93) 21,579 
IRA #584-83744 $300,770 (9/24/93) 106,385 194,385 
First Security accounts: 
MMA #18101217 (8/31/93) 31,871 
MMA #18101203 (8/31/93) 853 
MMA #217-80465-17 (9/30/93) 2,708 
MMA #217-80803-16 (9/30/93) 4,870 
IRA #600030024692514 (w) 632 
IRA #600310024665916 (w) 8,563 
IRA #60003002466114 (h) (9/30/93) 34,282 
IRA #600310024692417 (h) (9/30/93) 8,653 
Other accounts/stocks: 
Keystone Account (8/31/93) 
North Carolina NG 
GTE 
Paine Olsen #503431 
Merit Medical stock 
Wilmac Partnership T0864 
Insurance Policies: 
T r a v e l l e r s #073347-2269320 (8/31/93 
M i n n e s o t a #1 -781-6363 
#1-782-958 
Beneficial #BL1083753 
Lowell Gerber, P.C. 
Medical receivables 
Idaho Falls Antitrust Suit 
Park City Doctors Suit 
TOTAL VALUES 
1/2 
1/2 
11,250 
1/2 
5,585 
1/2 
1/2 
1/2 
44,958 
0 3 9 ) 
1/2 
$512,118 
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5,257 
2,284 
6,013 
-0-
9,404 
1/2 
(8,000 
$512,118 
«-\ r^ i \ 
6. Each party is ordered to be responsible for the 
payment of his or her own attorney's fees and costs. 
7. Each party is ordered to execute any documents and 
perform any acts necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree 
of Divorce when it is entered. 
DATED this 13 day of |\/ro-tvAX^ -\ , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
N&M 
HON. MICHAEL S. 
Commissioner 
EVANS 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
C
 1 ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ K/ / 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 /^ ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRBV "T*TT^ RB'-IUDICZAL DTSWfeCT/ 
, STATE " O E A J T A H *> ^ 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
oooOOOooo 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARY JO GERBER, : Civil No. 924905415DA 
Defendant. : Judge Richard H. Moffat 
oooOOOooo 
Plaintiff represents to the Court and alleges as follows: 
1. The parties were previously married to each other 
and at a pretrial hearing held in June, 1993, entered into a 
settlement agreement which was finally incorporated into the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
entered in this case on November 26, 1993. 
2. Under the terms of the Findings of Fact and Decree 
of Divorce defendant was awarded alimony from plaintiff in the sum 
of $4,000 a month, commencing with the month of July, 1993, based 
upon the then current financial circumstances of the parties as 
shown in their financial declarations and under circumstances where 
defendant was currently unable to work based upon her physical 
disability. 
K-y e^°r';; 
3. The Findings of Fact provided that, 
"There should be an automatic review of this 
alimony award in one year from the date of the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce or, earlier if 
circumstances warrant, based upon the anticipation 
that defendant will use her best efforts to seek 
and obtain employment at the highest economic 
level and will further use her best efforts to 
rehabilitate herself from her disability to help 
her achieve her best employment opportunities." 
4. Under the terms of the Findings and Decree it 
further provided for an examination by an orthopedic hand 
specialist, Dr. Larry Leonard, of defendants hand. That 
examination has now occurred and a report letter has been received 
from Dr. Leonard. In addition, Dr. Leonard has provided 
supplemental information by telephone. 
5. Defendant's physical disability is created by a 
tendon which is locked down by scar tissue which does not allow 
defendant to fold her thumb into her hand. This tendon can be 
freed by - a simple operation under local anesthetic with the 
expected result that the hand will be much more functional which 
will assist defendant in both her household activities and in her 
employment endeavors. Without the hand surgery the condition will 
not be corrected. 
6. Defendant informed Dr. Leonard that she does not 
intend to have the surgery to correct the tendon condition and it 
is plaintiff's further understated that she has stated that she has 
no intention of going to work and does not want to have her hand 
fixed because she would then have to go to work and, therefore, 
does not want the surgery to fix the hand. 
7. Defendant's actions constitute a voluntary 
continuation of her disability condition which are the basis for 
the review of the alimony award at this time in light of 
defendant's failure and refusal to meet the terms of the Findings 
and Decree as stipulated to in June of 1993. 
8. As a further entitlement for review, plaintiff 
asserts that his income is not providing sufficient income to meet 
his current living expenses. He currently receives a net take-home 
check each half month of $4,700, a total of $9,400 a month. From 
this he is required to pay defendant alimony and child support in 
the amount of $6,100. In addition, he is required to pay his 
disability insurance which was his understanding would be covered 
by the clinic by which he is employed. This understanding was in 
error and plaintiff is having to pay this premium out of his own 
salary at a cost of $800 a month. The remaining amount of $2,300 
a month is not sufficient to meet plaintiff's needs in an 
appropriate fashion. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment as follows: 
1. For a modification of the alimony award terminating 
defendant's entitlement to alimony based upon defendant's failure 
to comply with the terms of the Decree of Divorce and the 
circumstances which have changed since the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
2. For plaintiff's attorney's fees in bringing this 
proceeding. 
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3, For such other relief as the Court deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this ^j day of February, 1994. 
^ , S * 
B. L. DART 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
» / > 
I hereby certify that on the Jj-\ day of February, 1994, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
1.MV.MWJ V\. ','•' .aK 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
!.«;> -
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
MODIFICATION AND REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 924905415DA 
Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
oooOOOooo 
Defendant, Mary Jo Gerber# answers Plaintiff's Petition 
for Modific-ation as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted in that it states no circumstances which Plaintiff did 
not claim existed at the time this matter came on for trial and 
therefore presents no substantial change in circumstances. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraphs 1, 2, 
and 3 of Plaintiff's Petition. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations of Paragraph 4 of 
Plaintiff's Petition wherein Defendant has undergone an examination 
\ X . ft ft o r- r, i 
of Dr. L. Leonard, but has no knowledge of the alleged supplemental 
telephone information provided by Dr. Leonard and therefore denies 
said allegation. 
3. Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraphs 5, 6 
and 7 of Plaintiff's Petition. 
4. Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraph 8 of 
Plaintiff's Petition since she is without knowledge of his 
assertion and no verifying documentation has been submitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE AND CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
This action is not pursued by the Plaintiff in good faith 
in that there has been no substantial change in his financial 
situation from that which he asserted at the time of the pretrial 
settlement conference when he agreed to the terms and conditions of 
the Decree of Divorce. Defendant is pursuing employment 
opportunities and complying with the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce. -- In addition, as there has been no change of 
circumstances justifying a modification of the decree of divorce 
this court should require the Plaintiff to pay all court costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant request Plaintiff take nothing by 
this action and pay all court costs and attorney's fees incurred by 
the Defendant and for such further and other relief as the court 
deems just and appropriate.when advised in the premises. 
DATED this J~— day of March, 1994. 
O-t-xz*^ 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
B. L. DART (818) APR 2 5 1335 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOOooo 
LOWELL GERBER, : OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
v. : 
MARY JO GERBER, : Civil No. 924905415DA 
Defendant. : Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
oooOOOooo 
Plaintiff, Lowell Gerber, specifically objects to the 
defendant's proposed Findings of Fact as being inconsistent with 
the evidence in this case or the ruling made by the Court at the 
time of the Jbrial as follows: 
1. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 4 of the Findings of 
Fact for the reason that states that plaintiff's expenses have not 
increased and were not being fully expended. This is contrary to 
plaintiff's Exhibit 2, showing that plaintiff's expenses had 
increased by approximately $2,000, including expenses for 
disability insurance and for installment debts for purchase of 
furniture and furnishings in order to establish a new home. As 
such, the finding is an incorrect statement of the evidence at 
trial. 
X - i ^ $ ii ft - '7 •'" 
2. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 5 of the Findings of 
Fact in that said paragraph relies upon the finding in paragraph 4 
of the Findings of Fact and for the same reason it is objected to. 
3. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 8 of the Findings of 
Fact in its conclusion that no substantial change in the financial 
circumstances of the defendant have occurred. This is directly 
contrary to the finding in paragraph 7 of the proposed Findings of 
Fact that defendant's expenses have reduced by at least $1,000 
since the time of trial from $7,017 to $5,817 a month. 
4. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 9 of the Findings of 
Fact for the reasons set forth in the next three foregoing 
paragraphs which demonstrate that there has, in fact, been a change 
in financial circumstances of the plaintiff. 
5. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 11 of the Findings of 
Fact as it sets forth a theory of contract not raised by defendant 
at trial or in the original settlement of this case. This case was 
settled on the basis that defendant was disabled and that her 
income capacity would be reviewed within one year. 
6. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 16 of the Findings of 
Fact which sets forth a rationale approving defendant's current 
part-time employment as a substitute teacher which was not 
expressed by the Court in its ruling and is not consistent with the 
evidence. The evidence was that part-time dental hygienist 
employment is available and at the rates available to dental 
A-H r r ~ * 
hygienists this would provide to defendant working part-time an 
income of $2,000 a month. There was no testimony that part-time 
employment as a dental hygienist would not be consistent with the 
schooling situation of the children. 
7. Defendant objects to Findings of Fact paragraph 18 
for the reasons set forth in paragraph 6 above and for the further 
reason that it is inconsistent with the Court's finding that 
defendant is not employable as a dental hygienist because of her 
problems with "tactility", which don't allow her to pass the test 
for dental hygienists. Defendant's testimony was that it is not 
possible to gain this tactility as she cannot work on patients and 
there isn't a training situation available to allow her to gain 
tactility. The paragraph is further objected to as the last 
sentence is incomprehensible. 
8. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 2 of the Conclusions 
of Law as being inconsistent with the ruling of the trial court. 
The trial court found that based upon the current needs of the 
children defendant should not have to work more than part-time at 
the present time. The Court further found that defendant could not 
work as a dental hygienist as she is unable to pass the licensing 
test due to lack of tactility and, as such, she is doing all that 
she can. There is no support either in the testimony or in the 
ruling of the Court that defendant, if she were licensed as a 
dental hygienist, could not work part-time and still meets the 
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needs of the children earning a substantially higher income than 
she currently earns. 
DATED this 24th day of Aptfj/, /1995, / 
B. L. DART 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of April, 1995, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
K MM 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo— 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924905415DA 
Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
—oooOOOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on November 15, 1994, 
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding for trial of the Plaintiffs Petition to Modify 
the Decree of Divorce. The Plaintiff was present in person, and represented by counsel, 
B. L. Dart. The Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel David S. 
Dolowitz. The court heard the testimony of the parties and the witnesses, produced by 
each of the parties, received into evidence exhibits offered by the parties and being 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following as its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered November 
x _ n 
23, 1993. The Decree was based upon a Stipulation of the parties made in open court. 
2. Paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and paragraph 3 of the Decree 
of Divorce effecting the agreement of the parties were entered on November 23, 1993. 
They provide: 
"Defendant should be awarded alimony from the 
Plaintiff in the sum of $4,000.00 per month commencing with 
the month of July, 1993, based upon the current financial 
circumstances of the parties as shown in their Financial 
Declarations and under circumstances where Defendant is 
currently unable to work based upon her present physical 
disability. 
There should be an automatic review of this alimony 
award in one (1) year from the date of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce, or earlier if circumstances warrant, based 
upon the anticipation that Defendant will use her best efforts 
to seek and obtain employment at the highest economic 
level, and will further use her best efforts to rehabilitate 
herself from her disability to help her achieve her best 
employment opportunity. 
The issue is reserved as to whether Defendant's 
employment should be full or part-time based upon the needs 
of the children. At the time of the review, each party should 
have the right to express his or her respective position on 
this issue, as Plaintiffs position is that Defendant should seek 
and obtain full time employment and Defendant's position is 
that she should seek and obtain part-time employment due 
to the children's needs. 
Plaintiff should have the right to require Defendant to 
obtain a physical examination by a hand expert, currently, 
with a further examination six (6) months from the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce, and a second further examination one 
year from entry of Decree of Divorce to assist the court in 
determining the Defendant's ability to obtain employment. 
At the time of the review by the court, if there has 
been a substantial change in the financial circumstances or 
ability, then the court may make adjustments in the alimony 
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award based on those changes." 
3. The Plaintiff in his Financial Declaration of June of 1993 declared 
he had an income of $16,666.67 per month. In his Financial Declaration of August, 
1994, he declared income of $16,669.23 per month. 
4. At the time the Plaintiff submitted his Financial Declaration in June 
of 1993, he had already moved from Utah to Florida, established a residence, entered 
into practice and declared monthly living expenses of $6,344.00 per month. At the time 
he filed his August, 1994 Financial Declaration, the Plaintiff claimed living expenses of 
$6,370.00 per month, which when tested in cross-examination, he admitted he was not 
fully expending. 
5. Considering the Financial Declaration submitted by the Plaintiff in 
June of 1993, upon which the settlement of the matters reached by the parties were 
made and that submitted in August of 1994, as well as his testimony of November 15, 
1994, the court finds no substantial change in the financial status or circumstances of 
the Plaintiff between the date of the agreement of the parties, the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce and the trial of this matter on November 15, 1994. 
6. The Defendant submitted a Financial Declaration in June of 1993, 
stating she had no income and filed a Financial Declaration in August of 1994, declaring 
an income of $244.41 per month from substitute teaching. This, she testified, had 
increased to $300.00 per month at the time of trial. 
7. In June of 1993 the Plaintiff claimed living expenses of $7,017.00 per 
month for herself and the minor children of the parties. In August of 1994, the 
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Defendant claimed living expenses of $5,817.00 per month for herself and the minor 
children with reservations of several anticipated capital expenditures. 
8. The court finds no substantial change in the financial status or 
circumstances of the Defendant between the time of the agreement of the parties and 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce and the trial of this matter on November 15, 1994. 
9. The court determines that there was and has been no substantial 
change in the financial circumstances of the parties which would justify a modification 
of a Decree of Divorce between the time of the entry of their Agreement in June of 1993 
and the trial of this matter in November of 1994. 
10. The court finds that the issue which it heard on November 15, 1994 
was the reserved issue under paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and paragraph 3 of 
the Decree of Divorce which was whether or not the Defendant's employment should be 
full time or part time based upon the needs of the children, and the position of each in 
this regard, was-specifically reserved for trial, which the court heard and now determines. 
11. The court finds that the parties entered into an Agreement and the 
Plaintiff agreed at that time that based upon his earnings, he had the ability to pay the 
Defendant $4,000.00 per month as alimony and the Defendant had a need for $4,000.00 
per month as alimony and had no income at that time from which to contribute to her 
own support and while Defendant claimed she needed a greater sum than $4,000.00 per 
month in order to maintain the standard of living that she had enjoyed during the course 
of the marriage, she accepted that sum as a compromise of those claims in the belief 
that she could maintain an appropriate standard of living accepting that sum. 
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12. The parties are in conflict with the Plaintiff desiring his children to 
obtain religious instruction and participate in swimming, and other sport activities. It 
takes transportation and parental direction for those goals to be achieved. They do not 
just happen. Children are motivated largely by parents who are at home, not by a 
neighbor who picks them up and takes them some place. In order to have the children 
pursue their religious and sports activities, it is necessary that the Defendant be involved 
with them in doing so. Consequently, while the Plaintiff desires the Defendant to work 
full time, he also wants her to provide the direction, support, and transportation the 
children need for their religious and sports training and activities. Practically speaking, 
if the Defendant is working full time and keeping up a household, she does not have the 
time to provide transportation and support for the children in the religious and sports 
activities the Plaintiff wishes the children to pursue. 
13. Plaintiff desires the Defendant to work full time as a dental hygienist 
and represents to the court that she could earn $4,000.00 per month if she were doing 
so. The Defendant does not disagree with the potential earnings asserted by the Plaintiff 
but has pointed out to the court that she must work for a dentist and work the hours the 
dentist dictate that she work if she works as a dental hygienist. If she does this she will 
not be able to provide the transportation and support required by the children to carry 
out their religious training, sports and activities. 
14. The Defendant cannot be both a full time dental hygienist and look 
after the children and provide the support for their children in their religious and sports 
training as both Plaintiff and Defendant want her to do. The court heard testimony from 
5 
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physicians offered by each party as to whether or not the Defendant will require surgery 
to be able to function as dental hygienist. It is the Defendant's position that she could 
function as a dental hygienist if she could practice and get tactile sensitivity restored to 
her injured wrist. Surgery will not affect the tactility problem that exists. Surgery may 
increase her mobility, but it will not affect her ability to feel which she testified is 
necessary if she is to function as a dental hygienist. 
15. The court finds that the Defendant excelled in the dental hygienist 
examination in those portions of the test that were written, achieving a perfect score. 
She failed those portions that were practical because she did not have the tactile ability 
to function as required in order to be a dental hygienist. The Defendant testified she did 
not know of any program where she could practice working with patients which is 
necessary in order to get her tactile functioning restored if it is possible to do so. A 
program might be available to do this, but it appears to the court that the real issue is 
what are the needs of the children and measure this against the fiscal requirements to 
maintain the standard of living established in the Decree. This issue was specifically 
reserved in the Findings of Fact and Decree effecting the agreement of the parties. 
16. The Defendant is employed as a substitute school teacher and she 
has been able to work on a consistent basis those hours where her children are in 
school and this work is the most the Defendant is going to be able to undertake and 
provide the religious and sports training support and transportation that she has provided 
to the children during the marriage of the parties and since the entry of the Decree. The 
Defendant would not be able to secure similar hours as a dental hygienist because a 
6 
dentists hours do not coincide with school hours as do those of the substitute teaching 
in which the Defendant has been engaging. The Defendant transports the children to 
their religious training, their swimming, their ball games, scouting and all of the various 
activities in which they are involved. This does not give her freedom to work more than 
she is already working. She is working 32 hours per week, and that is what the court 
finds that she could work and provide for the children as she has. 
17. The court finds from hearing the testimony of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant, and considering the positions taken by them in their pleadings, that the 
Plaintiff requests this court to choose to sacrifice the children and order the Defendant 
to work. The Defendant has chosen not to sacrifice the interests of the children, but to 
put them in a paramount position and to work on a secondary basis, and in working 32 
hours per week, is working all that she can work and still provide the support to the 
children that they need to continue with their activities. 
t & The court has determined that the Defendant could earn $25.00 per 
hour instead of $5.90 if she were working as a dental hygienist rather than as a 
substitute teacher, but to do so would require her to not provide the parental support to 
the minor children of the parties that both Plaintiff and Defendant desire her to provide. 
If she does not increase her earnings above their present level, she will over the course 
of the court's Order as is hereinafter provided, decrease her income by $1,000.00 per 
month in order to provide that assistance to her children. 
19. The court finds that the parties entered into a Stipulation for payment 
of child support of $2,100.00 for three children, that the income of the Plaintiff is 
7 
substantially in excess of the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines, that the parties, 
concomitantly with their agreement for support, entered into an agreement for visitation 
and did not provide in their agreement for any abatement of child support during the 
visitation. Evaluation of the child support shows it is not a standard award, nor is it 
statistical variation of the child support guidelines. The agreed upon child support is a 
negotiated figure between the parties entered into for the best interests of the children. 
20. Each of the parties have employed counsel to bring this matter 
before the court and the issues litigated by them through their counsel are those issues 
that were reserved in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and paragraph 3 of the Decree 
of Divorce. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the court now makes and enters 
the following, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
\. There has been no substantial change of circumstances since the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in this case. 
2. The alimony set in the Decree of Divorce effects the decisions of the 
parties to provide for the religious and sports training and activities of their children and 
still require the Defendant to participate in self support. If Defendant elects to continue 
as a substitute teacher, she will not be able to earn the same income that she could earn 
as a dental hygienist and her income will decrease. She will thus be presented with the 
choice of earning some or all of the income that she could earn as dental hygienist with 
that she will earn as a teacher. The alimony award thus made considers and effects the 
8 
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fact that the Plaintiff earns in excess of $200,000.00 per year and has produced an 
affluent lifestyle for himself and the Defendant, that the Defendant has given up her 
career as a dental hygienist in order to care for the children of the parties by mutual 
agreement, that even though Defendant has suffered a debilitating injury, she could 
probably still function as a dental hygienist provided that she did not have to provide 
care for the children, but the parties have elected a lifestyle which included a substantial 
time commitment from the Defendant to be involved in the religious and sports training 
activities for the children, and as the parties live in Park City, and many of these 
activities are in Salt Lake City, the Defendant must spend substantial time transporting 
the children. The court has determined that the Defendant has sought employment on 
her own and has secured employment as a substitute teacher, that considering the 
needs of the Defendant if she is to maintain the lifestyle that the parties enjoyed during 
their marriage and her own ability to produce income, this court should continue the 
alimony as set-at $4,000.00 per month until December 1, 1995 when it should be 
reduced by $500.00 per month until December 1, 1996 when it should be reduced by an 
additional $500.00 per month and continue thereafter at $3,000.00 per month until the 
death or remarriage of the Defendant or further order of the court. As this adjustment 
considers and effects what the Defendant can earn herself in order to assist herself in 
maintaining the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their marriage and the 
ability of the Plaintiff to produce income to both maintain his lifestyle and contribute to 
meet the needs of the Defendant. 
3. The parties entered into an agreement for child support at $2,100.00 
9 
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per month per child and this should not abate during the summer or any period of 
extended visitation as it is not a standard child support order and is not based on a 
calculation from the child support guidelines. This child support was agreed to based 
on the needs of the children at the time the agreement was entered into and therefore 
no abatement should occur during visitation. 
4. There has been no substantial change in circumstances in this 
matter which would justify any modification of the Decree of Divorce. The matter tried 
by the court was one reserved by the parties in paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce. 
5. Each of the parties should assume and bear their own costs and 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this / £ day of ,;£„*> , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
10 
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APPROVED AS EFFECTING 
THE RULING OF THE COURT: 
B. L. DART, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, 
Counsel for Defendant 
ADDRESS AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
NUMBER FOR DEBTOR: 
Mr. Lowell Gerber 
Social Sec. No. 350-40-2033 
8540 College Parkway 
Fort Myers, FL 33919 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this / - ^ -day of April, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the 
following individual: 
B. L. Dart, Esq. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main, Ste. I330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
> 
(LAml\QerL,303) 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
J U N 2 0 1935 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo— 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant. 
<2(g76?4 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924905415DA 
Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
—oooOOOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on November 15, 1994, 
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding for trial of the Plaintiffs Petition to Modify 
the Decree of Divorce. The Plaintiff was present in person and represented by counsel, 
B. L. Dart. The Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel David S. 
Dolowitz. The court heard the testimony of the parties and the witnesses, produced by 
each of the parties, received into evidence exhibits offered by the parties and being 
advised in the premises, the court made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now therefore: 
K _ . , i\ A r- (< < ' 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Alimony shall continue to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant 
at the rate of $4,000.00 per month until December 1, 1995 at which time it shall be 
reduced by $500.00 per month to the sum of $3,500.00 per month and continue at that 
rate until December 1, 1996 when it shall be reduced by an additional $500.00 per 
month to the sum of $3,000.00 per month at which sum it shall remain or continue until 
the death or remarriage of the Defendant or further order of the court. 
2. Child support shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the 
rate of $2,100.00 per month and it shall not abate during the summer or any period of 
extended visitation. 
3. Each of the parties shall assume and bear their own costs and 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this / £ day of s/L~ «» , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
C^IK -. 
DOUGbStTcOR'NABY, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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APPROVED AS EFFECTING THE 
RULING OF THE COURT: 
B. L. DART, Counsel 
for Plaintiff 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, 
Counsel for Defendant 
DEBTOR'S ADDRESS AND 
SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 
Lowell Gerber 
Social Sec. No. 350-40-2033 
8540 College Parkway 
Fort Myers, FL 33919 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 O O O 0 0 0 — 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant. 
— 0 0 0 O O O 0 0 0 — 
The Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on April 25, 1995. Also on that date he 
objected to the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Defendant. The Plaintiff 
submitted the affidavit of Dr. Bonnie Branson with his motion The Defendant filed a response to 
this motion on May 2, 1995. About May 17, 1995, the Plaintiff filed a response. No one has 
requested oral argument on this motion and the court does not believe it would serve any 
purpose. 
The decree of divorce was entered on November 23, 1993. The decree provided for an 
"automatic review of the alimony award in one (1) year from the date of the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce, or earlier if circumstances warrant..." The decree also provided that "the issue is 
reserved as to whether Defendant's employment should be full or part-time based upon the needs 
of the children." The Court heard this matter on November 15, 1994, and took testimony on both 
of the above issues and made findings and conclusions therefrom. 
The Plaintiff wants the Defendant to work full time and earn $4,000 per month as a dental 
hygienist. Presumably, if she did earn $4,000 he would not have to pay alimony. The Court 
looked at this problem at the trial on November 15, 1994. The Defendant had contacted the 
Dental Hygiene School at Weber State University. No program was available. The affidavit of 
the Director, Dr. Bonnie Branson, states that there still is no program for the Defendant. A 
program could possibly be designed to help the Defendant. Dr. Branson cautions, however, that 
the Defendant may not qualify for the admission requirements of the school. If she is admitted to 
work in a special program at the school and completes the training the Defendant would still not 
RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL AND ON OBJECTIONS TO 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924905415DA 
be guaranteed certification. The Defendant testified at trial that she still does not have the tactile 
ability to function as required in order to be a dental hygienist. 
A new trial could not prove that the Defendant has the tactile ability to be a dental 
hygienist. It could not prove that the Defendant would qualify for admission to Weber's Dental 
Hygiene School, that a special program would in fact be designed, that after completing the 
program the Defendant would have the tactile ability to function as a dental hygienist, and that the 
Defendant would in fact be certified. 
The Court at trial concluded that the Defendant should be able to earn more than her 
current monthly income of $300 per month. The Court gave her until December, 1995, to 
increase her income by $500 per month, and until December, 1996, to increase her income by 
another $500 per month. The Court knew this would be full time work and would not be in the 
children's best interest. The Plaintiff, however, insisted upon it. 
A new trial would not resolve any compelling issues in this case. The request for a new 
trial is denied. If at any time in the future the Defendant in fact works and earns in excess of 
$1,300 per month, then it will be appropriate for the Plaintiff to request an alimony modification 
hearing. 
The Plaintiff has objected to the findings of fact and conclusions of law. His objections 
really go to the Court's failure to find the facts favorable to him. For example, he objects to 
paragraph 4 of the Findings because he claims his expenses have increased in Florida. The Court 
does not doubt that the Plaintiff has the ability to spend the entire $4,000 now ordered by the 
Court to go to the Defendant as alimony. The Plaintiff is expected to live within his income just 
as the Defendant is expected to live within the $4,000 per month alimony. 
The Court finds no errors in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. They in fact 
reflect the rulings of the Court. The Court does not see that justice would be served by changing 
them at this time. The Court approves them and is signing them at the same time as this ruling. 
The Defendant is awarded a reasonable attorney fee for defending against these 
proceedings. 
Dated June 16, 1995. 
By the Court: 
A-33 © c « - C ' ' a " 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ(0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P.O.Box I 1008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
—oooOOOooo— 
ORDER 
vs. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 924905415DA 
Judge: Douglas L. Cornaby 
—oooOOOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs Motion 
for New Trial and Objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by 
Defendant's counsel to effect the ruling of the Court after the trial held on November 15,1994. The 
Court considered the pleadings submitted by each of the parties in support of their position and issued 
its Ruling, declaring its basis for its decision that Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and Objections to the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not well taken. 
Accordingly, 
A - ^ l 
W&*v: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiffs request for a new trial is denied. 
2. The proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do reflect the rulings of 
the Court and the Court has approved and executed them. 
3. Defendant is awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred by her in defending 
these proceedings. She shall submit appropriate application and support therefor for further 
consideration by this Court. 
DATED J_51 day of JJAAJKU^T, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO (> 
FORM Ah t f ^eeN^ jT : ' 
?. 
B. L. DART 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
?(J\^ 
HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. CORNAB 
Third Judicial District Court 
Q ' 
A , L^L # . . - . 
- > ' DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
mary\gerber\order 
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' PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
STATEMENT OP MONTHLY INCOME 
LOWELL GERBER 
(From Year-to-date Paystub attached/ 9.69 Months) 
Paystub Monthly 
9.69 mo. Average 
Gross monthly salary 
($200,000/year) $7,692.31 $16,666.66 
Less: 
FICA $(6,157.70) (635.39) 
Federal taxes (37,571.59) (3,877.36) 
Alimony (4,000.00) 
Child Support (2,100.00) 
NET EXPENDABLE MONTHLY INCOME $6/053.91 
K -> r 
'HWEST FLORIDA HEART GROUP, P.A. FORT MYERS FL 33919 
>r2.od: 1 0 / 0 1 / 9 4 - 1 0 / 1 4 / 9 4 
Type //ours Earn Amount Ded Amount 
*guJar 80.00 
021340 
Cross 
FICA 
FEDS 
CHECK NO. 
Current 
21340 
y - T -
<\ I t*Ai 
$7,692.31 $161,538.53 
$111.54 $ 6 , 1 5 7 . 7 0 
$2, 352. 06 $37, 571. 59 
ieck # . 21340 Date: 10/19/94 Check Amount $ 5 , 2 2 8 . 7 1 
f>*f i^i*^*-*! *<• v W*; **,, «* sjfcoWff^ ^ ' T N M 8 # ^ «8^^«^>5d J4^i>ttn*^ 
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STATEMENT OF MONTHLY LIVING EXPENSES ^7Jf^° 
LOWELL GERBER 
Mortgage payment 
Homeowners insurance—$560/year 
Flood insurance—$105/year 
Homeowners association fee—$l/200/year 
Maintenance—Home, lawn, pool 
Utilities 
Telephone, including cellular 
Food and household supplies 
Housekeeper 
Laundry/dry cleaning 
Clothing 
Dental 
Disability insurance 
Automobile and boat insurance 
Health club 
Entertainment 
Cable TV 
Travel costs— 
Children's visitation, 3x year @$650 x 3 children 
Lowell 
Child care—summer camp and babysitter during visits 
Automobile expenses (personal portion) 
Gifts: Birthdays, Barmitzvas, Christmas, 
other family holidays 400 
,005 
47 
9 
100 
225 
200 
250 
400 
86 
80 
150 
60 
613 
230 
20 
250 
50 
487 
300 
100 
150 
Accounting (tax advice/tax returns) 
Legal 
Incidentals 
Installment payments @10%/month—see list below* 
College prepayment plan beg. 1/95 (2 children) 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES $8,439 
installment debts: 
Robin Stuckey/furniture $4,300 
Circuit City/computer 3,500 
Save-On Furniture 1,800 
VISA/airfare 3,175 
Total installment debts $12,775 
1 
100 
200 
50 
, 2 7 7 
600 
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B. L. DART (818) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant. 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Civil No. 924905415 
Dated: June, 1993 
Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
Hon. Michael S. Evans 
oooOooo 
Husband: 
Address: 
Soc. Sec. # 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Birrhdate: 
LOWELL GERBER 
5260 S. Landings Dr. 
F501 
Ft. Myers, FL 33919 
350-40-2033 
Physician 
Southwest Florida Heart Group 
8-22-49 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and 
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures are on a 
biweekly basis, multiply by 2.167) 
HUSBAND WIFE 
1. Gross monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including 
commissions, bonuses, 
allowances and overtime 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 
$ 1 6 , 6 6 6 . 6 7 1 
$ 1 6 , 6 6 6 . 6 7 
Imputea 
$2 , 0 0 0 . 00 2 
$ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Plaintiff1s salary commencing May 1, 1993. 
defendant has a college degree and has been certified as a 
dental hygienist. The income capacity of a dental hygienist is 
between $150-200 per day or $3,000-4,000 per month. Even working 
part-time, defendant has the capacity to earn $2,000 which should 
be imputed to her. 
2. Monthly deductions from gross income: 
Income taxes: State/Federal $(4,759.36) 
Number of Exemptions taken: 
Social Security $(1,275.19) 
Medical or other insurance (describe) 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 
Savings plan 
Credit union 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS $ (6,034.55) 
3. NET MONTHLY INCOME $10,6 3 2.12 
4. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: 
Monthly 
Creditor's Name /Purpose Balance Payment 
(H) Elam, Burke, Boyd/Idaho Antitrust $8,326.55 $500.00 
(H) Robb Stucky/furniture $8,060.00 300.00 
(H) Sun Bank/car loan 18,000.00 500.00 
(J) First Security/Park City mortgage 206,000.00 $2,546.00 
A^A\ 
ALL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES known to me owned individually or 
jointly. 
Current Owed 
Value Thereon 
(a) Household furniture/furnishings, 
appliances, equipment: 
(W) Family Affairs appraisal $14,334 
(H) $4,000 + 10,000 new purchase 14,000 (8,060) 
(b) Automobiles: 
(W) 1993 Ford Aerostar 20,000 
(H) 1993 Mitsubishi 22,000 
(H) 1983 Porsche 13,000 (18,000) 
(c) Securities, stocks, bonds: 
(H) North Carolina NG 2,502 
(H) GTE 1,200 
(W) Payne Olsen #503431 (est) 14,000 
(Need current statement from defendant) 
(W) Stocks in safe deposit box ? 
(Defendant was to inventory) 
(d) Cash and deposit account: 
See list attached. 
(e) Life Insurance: 
Name of Company Policy No- Face Amt. Cash value 
(H) Minnesota #1-781-6363 359,598 2,284 
#1-782-958 800,000 6,013 
(H) Beneficial #BL108375*3 750,000 -0-
(f) Profit Sharing or Retirement Accounts/IRA's: 
Value and 
Amount Nov; 
Name of Plan or Where Held Vested 
See list attached re IRA's. 
X A -» 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets and Values: None 
(h) Real Estate: 
Type of Property: Residence 
Date Acquired: 8/89 
Present Value: $382,000 
Basis of Valuation: 
Webber appraisal 
Address: 3028 Meadows Dr. 
Park City, UT 
Original Cost: $350,000 
Cost of Additions: 
Total Cost: 
Mortgage Balance: $206,000 
Other Liens: 
Equity: $176,000 
Monthly Payment: $ 2,546 
Taxes/year: $ 4,201 
Comments: Refinancing in progress; will lower payment to 
approximately $1,800. 
To Whom: First Secuirty 
Address: Bear Lake 
Original Cost: 
Cost of Additions: 
Total Cost: 
Mortgage Balance: -0-
Other Liens: 
Equity: 
Monthly Paymenr: 
Taxes/year: 
Individual Contributions: 
Type of Property: Lot 
Date Acquired: 
Present Value: $10,000 
Basis of Valuation: 
Comparable sales 
To Whom: 
Address: New Orleans 
Original Cost: 
Cost of Additions: 
Total Cost: 
Mortgage Balance: 
Other Liens: 
Equity: 
Monthly Payment: 
Taxes/year: 
Individual Contributions: 
Type of Property: Condo/Timeshare 
Date Acquired: 
Present Value: $10,000 
Basis of Valuation: 
Opinion based on cost. 
To Whom: 
(i) Business Interest: 
(H) Lowell Gerber, P.C. checking acct $ 9,404 (6/22/93 
(H) Medical receivables 6/22/93 1 2 , 8 9 4 3 
A c c o u n t s a r e o v e r 120 d a y s a n d b a s i c a l l y n o t c o l l e c t i b l e . 
A y\ X 
6. MONTHLY EXPENSES: 
Rent 
Power 
Phone 
Water 
Food and household supplies 
Clothing 
Laundry 
Auto insurance 
Automobile expenses: gasoline, maintenance 
Life insurance 
Health insurance (family coverage) 
Children f s psycnologist 
Entertainment 
Health club 
Travel (travel cost in connection v/ith 
children's visitation 2x/year each) 
Haircuts 
Newspaper/Magazines 
Gifts, including Christmas 
Incidentals 
Debt service 
TOTAL MONTHLY LIVING EXPENSES 
Currently also paying Park City mortgage 
TOTAL CURRENT EXPENSES 
K - ^ 
(j) Other Assets: 
(H) Wilmac Partnership T0864 $44,958 
(formerly in Pension Plan) 
(H) Idaho Falls Antitrust Suit Settled 
(Case settled on "walk-away11 basis; no monies reco 
Attorney's fees still owed by plaintiff of $8,000 
(H) Park City Doctors Suit ? 
A-A5 
FINANCIAL AND IRA ACCOUNTS 
Gerber v. Gerber 
Merrill Lynch Accounts: 
(J) CMA #587-29077 (1/31/93) $177,874 
(H) WCMA #330-97271 (1/31/93) 75,978 
(W) IRA #587-83743 (12/31/92) 18,534 
(H) IRA #584-83744 (1/31/93) 279,525 
First Security Accounts: 
(J) FSB #18101217 (6/21/93) 1,216 
(W) MMA #18101203 (6/21/93 847 
(W) MMA #217-804650-17 (6/21/93) 2,683 
(J) MMA #217-80803-16 (6/21/93) 4,836 
(W) IRA #600030024692514 (1/31/93) 632 
(W) IRA #600310024665916 (1/31/93) 8,475 
(H) IRA #60003002466114 (1/31/93) 32,574 
(H) IRA #600310024692417 (1/31/93) 8,475 
Other accounts: 
(H) Keystone IRA (1/31/93) 5,519 
(H) Travellers IRA F973347-21269320 5,185 
A ~ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I hereby certify that the matters stated herein are true and 
c o r r e c t , 
, ^ ^ X y { 
LOWELL GERBER, P l a i n t i f f 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e r.e t h i s ^ ( T d a y of 
1 9 9 3 . 
Commi9S 
Notary FWc ^ 
JEHMFSROCSON I 
310 SouhUm #1330 i 
Sa*Lsk»C*y.Ufeh 84101 ! 
My Ccrnmfc*bn Expires 1 
Mardi23,1997 I 
p i resSfcto erf Utah • 
A-AI 
Husband's (X) Wife's ( ) 
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF PENDING 
DIVORCE LITIGATION 
Child Support: $700/child Total (per month) $2 , 100* 
Alimony: $3 ,000 Total (per month) $3 , 000** 
*At such time as only two minor children reside at home, support 
would automatically reduce to $1,400, and when only one minor 
child is at home, support would reduce to $825. 
**Alimony at $3,000 per month for period of one year, then to 
automatically reduce to $2,000 per month, until such time as 
plaintiff remarries, cohabits, dies or there is a change of 
financial circumstances of the parties warranting reduction. 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION: 
1. Defendant to be awarded custody of the three minor 
children subject to plaintiff's visitation as follows: 
a. One half of summer vacation, including the 
right to have any one or two children for a separate one-week 
period as part of his half summer with each child. Plaintiff 
would provide defendant with at. least two months notice of when 
he is choosing to exercise his summer visitation. 
b. Plaintiff should have the right to have the 
children for one-half the Christmas break with Christmas Eve and 
Christmas Day being alternated between plaintiff and defendant. 
Plaintiff shall have the children for Christmas Eve and Christmas 
Day and half the Christmas break in even-nunbered years and 
defendant shall have the children for Christmas Eve and Christmas 
Day in odd-numbered years. 
c. Plaintiff should have the right to visit with 
the children anytime he is in Utah upon providing to plaintiff as 
much advance notice as he has of his trip to Utah. In the event 
the notice is less than 24 hours, Dr. Gerber would respect any 
other scheduled activities the children have. 
d. One half of holidays, to be alternated 
between the parties. 
e. A weekend for each child within the week or 
two of that childfs birthday. 
A-A8 
2. Plaintiff will maintain health insurance coverage 
on the minor children so long as they qualify as dependents. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded the income tax 
exemptions for the children based on his paying child support in 
excess of the Guidelines. 
4. Assets divided as set forth on attached "Proposed 
Distribution of Assets". 
5. Each party to pay his or her own respective 
attorney's fees and costs. 
&-4q 
6/22/93 
PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS 
Gerber v. Gerber 
Mary Jo Lowell 
JPark City home equity $176,000 
Bear Lake lot 10,000 
New Orleans condo 10,000 
household furniture 14,334 5,940 
3Vehicles: 
1993 Ford Aerostar 20,000 
1992 Mitsubishi Diamante 22,000 
1983 Porsche -0-
Merrill Lynch accounts: 
4CMA #587-29077 $177,874 (1/93) 71,227 106,647 
WCMA #330-97271 $75,978 (1/93) 75,978 
IRA #587-83743 (12/92) (w) 18,534 
IRA #584-83-7-44 $279,525 (1/93) (h] 139,763 139,763 
First Security accounts: 
5MMA # 1 8 1 0 1 2 1 7 ( 6 / 2 1 / 9 3 ) 1 , 2 1 6 
MMA #18101203 (6/21/93) 847 
MMA #217-80465-17 (6/21/93) 2,683 
MMA #217-80803-16 (6/21/93) 4,836 
6IRA #600030024692514 (v) 632 
IRA #600310024665916 (w) 8,475 
IRA #60003002466114 (h) 32,574 
IRA #600310024692417 (h) 8,475 
Dther accounts/stocks: 
Keystone IRA 1/31/93 5,519 
North Carolina NG 2,502 
GTE 1,200 
7Payne Olsen #503431 (est.) 14,000 
8Stocks in safe deposit box ? 
Wilmac Partnership T0864 44,958 
Mary Jo Lowel l 
I n s u r a n c e P o l i c i e s : 
^ T r a v e l l e r s #073347-2269320 5 ,185 
M i n n e s o t a #1 -781-6363 2 ,284 
# 1 - 7 8 2 - 9 5 8 6 ,013 
1 2 B e n e f i c i a l #BL1083753 - 0 -
13Lowell G e r b e r , P . C . 9 ,404 
, 4Medical r e c e i v a b l e s 1/2 1/2 
1 5Idaho F a l l s A n t i t r u s t S u i t (8 ,000) 
I 6Park C i t y D o c t o r s S u i t 
TOTAL VALUES $476 ,495 $476,494 
A ^ l 
Explanatory notes: 
1. Webber appraisal $382,000 less outstanding mortgage $206,000 = equity 
$176,000. 
2. Furniture in Mary Jo's possession from Family Affairs appraisal. 
Since the parties' separation, Dr. Gerber purchased $3-4,000 worth of 
furniture prior to moving to Florida. Since moving to Florida, he has 
purchased another $10,000 on which he owes $8,060. 
3. Vehicle values are based on purchase prices. 
The 1983 Porsche has just been acquired for $18,000 and is financed by 
an $18,000 credit line owed to Sun Bank. 
4. This account is being used as the "plug figure" to achieve parity of 
the overall marital estate. 
5. Money market account balances per telephone quote to Jennifer Olson 
from First Security Bank 6/21/93. 
5. Balances 1/31/93. Each to take IRA's m own name. 
7. Defendant was to obtain a statement on current value. 
I. Defendant was to provide inventory of stocks in deposit box. 
) . Steps being taken to contact Bill Maeck in Idaho Falls to arrive at 
current value. 
0. This is an IRA. 
1. Face values $359,598 and $800,000 respectively. 
2. Face $750,000. 
3. Current balance 6/22/93 in P.C. checking account. 
4. Collectibility of receivables is doubtful as all are over 120 days 
old. Defendant proposes receivables be accounted for as received 
after payment of expenses including salary of Lynn Pace and fees for 
collection agency. Net: receivables should be divided between parties 
with each to bear tax consequences of their share. 
5. This case was settled on a walk-away basis with no monies received. 
Plaintiff presently still owes $8,000 in attorney's fees related to 
the suit. 
6. Filing of suit is imminent. Plaintiff would agree to take this asset 
subject to any liabilities; otherwise would divide equally with 
defendant with her to share liabilities. It is plaintiff's belief 
that the Park City situation is a negative and any recovery would only 
be offset against liability exposure for the remaining 2-1/2 years of 
the lease. 
h-52. 
B. L. DAJRT (818) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3io South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
DEFENDANT'S 
isuMos+jsr* 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant. 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Civil No. 924905415DA 
Dated: August, 19 94 
Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
Hon. Michael S. Evans 
oooOooo 
Husband: LOWELL GERBER 
Address: 4120 Steamboat Bend E 
Apt- 3 06 
Ft. Myers, FL 3 3919 
Soc. Sec. #: 350-40-2033 
Occupation: Physician 
Eraployer: Southwest Florida 
Heart Group 
Birthdate: 8/22/49 
Wife: 
Address: 
Soc* Sec. r' 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Birthdate: 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and 
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures are on a 
biweekly basis, multiply by 2.167) 
Gross monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including 
commissions, bonuses, 
allowances and overtime, 
payable biweekly 
(see paystub attached) 
HUSBAND WIFE 
$16,669.23 
A 
pension and retirement 
Social Sfecxxxit.^ 
pisability and unemployment 
public assistance 
Child support from any 
prior marriage 
Dividends and interest 
pents 
Other sources: 
tfOTAL MONTHLY INCOME $16,669,23 
2. Monthly deductions from gross income: 
Xivcai&e. t^xes \ F^deral / state C3 > G 4 2.14 } 
dumber of Exemptions taken: 
Social Security (1,275.19) 
fledical or other insurance (describe) 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 
Savings plan 
Credit union 
Other (specify) 
£OTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS $(4,317.33) 
3. tfET MONTHLY INCOME $12,351.90 
k-5*\ 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: 
Creditor's Name/Purpose Balance 
Monthly 
Payment 
Robb & Stucky/Furniture 
Heritage Bank/Construction Loan 
$4,481.78 
$52,000,00 
$250.00 
$2,100.00 
5. ALL PROPERTY OP THE PARTIES known to me owned individually or 
jointly. 
PLEASE NOTE: The parties were divorced in July 1993 and divided 
their property interests at that time, and there are no property 
issues relevant to this modification proceeding. 
/V-55" 
6- MONTHLY EXPENSES: 
Mortgage payment $2
 1100 
(Mortgage rate will rise 1-2% next year) 
Maintenance and homeowners association fee 3 00 
Food and household supplies 4 00 
Utilities 200 
Telephone 150 
Laundry/cleaning 80 
Clothing 150 
Dental 100 
Insurance (disability) 800 
Child care—summer camp and babysitter during 
visitation periods 100 
Health club 40 
Entertainment 5 00 
Incidentals 50 
Travel costs—children's visitation 800 
Automobile expenses 3 50 
Installment payment: Furniture 250 
Florida college prepayment plan (2 children) 6Q0_ 
TOTAL $6,370 
A-5fc> 
STATE OF FLORIDA 
COUNTY OF 
ss. 
correct. 
I hereby certify that the matters stated herein are true and 
-o 
LOWELL I. GERBER, Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before roe this // day of 
(jjspufjr _. iM 
Commission expires:. 
jffiBfo ROSNB.KiLEa 
£ ? & V - tfYCC**C$$»N# CO 2681*9 
.& &HPES:M& 17.1997 
3^ ZXWT^VW *&**<***** 
0*i.:. A 
NOTARY PUBLIC , ^ . J .,- ; 
Residing at 1'tdtot. I L/J) Kri 
A-51 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ Bar No. 0899 
Attorney for Defendant 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0008 
Telephone: [801] 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant, 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Civil No. 924905415 
Date: June 23, 1993 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
-oooOooo 
Husband: Lowell Gerber 
Addre s s: 
350-40-2033 Soc. Sec. No. 
Occupation: 
Employer: Southwest Florida 
Physician 
Heart Group 
Birth Date: 8/22/49 
Wife: Marv Jo Gerber 
Address: 302 8 Meadows Drive 
Park Citv, Utah 
Soc. Sec. No. 
Occupation: _ 
Employer: 
529-72-9417 
Birth Dare: 
Komemaker 
-0-
7/6/51 
NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 
5 DAYS PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO 
COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL AUTHORIZE THE 
COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS 
DECISION. ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE 
PENALTY FOR PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and 
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4. 3; If figures are on a bi-
weekly basis, multiply by 2.167) 
HUSBAND WIFE 
1. GROSS MONTHLY INCOME FROM: 
Salary and wages, including commissions, 16,666.00 -0-
bonuses, allowances and over-time, 
payable: (pay period) 
Pensions and retirement: 
Social Security: 
Disability and unemployment insurance: 
Public Assistance (welfare, AFDC pay-
ments, etc. ): _ 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest: . 
Rents: 
All other sources (specify) , 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME: 
2. ITEMIZE MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS 
INCOME: - -
State and federal income taxes: , 
Number of exemptions taken: 
Social Security: 
Medical or other insurance (describe 
fully): 
Union or other dues: _ 
Retirement or pension funds: 
Savings Plan: 
Credit Union: 
Other (specify): 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS: 
3. NET MONTHLY INCOME - TAKE HOME PAY: 
- 2 -
A~-5<\ 
4. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: 
Date Monthly 
Creditor' s Name For Payable Balance Payment 
First Security 1st Morta. 6206, 000 *S2. 546. 00 
TOTAL: $ $ 
* I s i n p r o c e s s o f b e i n g r e f i n a n c e d . 
ALL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES know to me owned Individually or 
jointly (Indicated who holds or how title held: (H) Husband, (W) 
Wife, or (J) Jointly). WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE 
INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE. 
( a ) H o u s e h o l d f u r n i s h i n g s , f u r n i t u r e , 
a p p l i a n c e s , and equ ipment : 
(b) A u t o m o b i l e (Year-Make) : 
PI alntlff Defendant 
-f- 14,334.00 
1993 - Ford Aerostar -0- 20,000.00 
1993 - Mitsubishi 22,000.00 -0-
(c) Securities - stocks, bonds: 
S&e attached Exhibit "C 
(d) Cash and deposit accounts (banks, 
savings & loans, credit unions -
savings & checking: 
See attached Exhibit "C" 
(e) Life Insurance: 
Policy Cash Value, accumulated 
Name of Company No. FacB Amt. dividend, or loan amt. 
See attached Ex. " C" 
- 3 -
t\~GQ 
( f ) Profit Sharing or Value of Interest and Amount 
Retirement Accounts Presently Vested 
Name: See attached Ex. "C" 
Name: 
Name: 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (Specify): 
(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, 
attach sheet with identical information for all additional 
property): 
Address: 302 8 Meadows Drive Type of Property: Single Family 
Park City, Utah 84060 Date of Acquisition: Aug. 198 9 
Original Cost: $ 350,000.00 Total Present Value: 5382,000.00 
Cost of Additions: $ Basis for Valuation: Appraised by 
Total Cost: $ 350,000.00 Jerry Webber 
Mtg. Balance: $ 206, 000. 00 
Other Liens: $ -0-
Equity: $ 17. 700. 00 
Monthly Amortization $ 2, 546. 00 And to Whom: First Security 
Taxes: $ 4, 201. 00 
Individual Contributions: 
*Bear Lake lot to Defendant and New Orleans time share to Plaintiff. 
(i) Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business, 
value less indebtedness): 
(j) Other Assets (Specify): 
- 4 
A-Gi 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES: *(Specify which party is the custodial 
parent and list names and relationship of all members of the 
household whose expenses are included) 
Rent or Mortgage Payments (residence) 2, 546. 00* 
Real property taxes (residence) f 4, 992. 00/vr) 416.00 
Real property insurance (residence) (61.080/yr) 90. 00 
Maintenance (residence) 500. 00 
Food and household supplies 900.00 
Utilities inc. water, electricity, gas & heat 
electricity, 680.00; Mtn. Fuel, 6140; water, 
aarbaae, 653. 00 273.00 
Telephone 85. 00 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothing 100. 00 
Medical (defendant only)(S250/ded. + 640/mth) 60. 83 
Dental (defendant only) 
Insurance (life, health, accident, comprehensive 
liability) exclude payroll deducted (COBRA) 171.00 
Child Care 
Payment of child spousal support prior marriage 
School ? 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obliga-
tions, travel recreation) Travel, SI 50;Clubs 200. 00 
S50. 00 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts 
and donations} (Grooming, 660; Gifts, 660) 120.00 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto e x p e n s e ( g a s , o i l , r e p a i r , i n s u r a n c e ) 240.30 
fcas, 6160; insurance, S80. 30) 
Auto payments 
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach 
itemized schedule if not fully set forth in 
(d) on the first page hereof) 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on 
attached schedule) See attached Schedules 
for Rebecca (6409.29), David (6421.87); Jonathan 1,238. 36 
6407. 20) 
Cable T. V. 65.00 
Professional Dues ($150.00/yr) .12.50 
Anticipated taxes: ? 
TOTAL EXPENSES: $7,017.99 
*Is being refinanced to approximately $1,800.00. 
- D -
/VfcZ 
Gerber v. Gerber 
Additional Monthly Expenses for Minor Children 
NAME: Rebecca Age: 13 Sex: Female 
(11-17-79) 
Doctor: ($250. 00 deductible) $ 20. 83 
Dentist: $150. 00/yr. minimum $ 12. 50 
Optometrist $ ? 
* Orthodontist $ -0-
Drugs/prescriptions $ 7. 00 
School Lunches ($1. 25 x 5 x 4. 3) $ 21. 50 
**Allowance $ 40. 00 
Lessons: 
- piano $ 40. 00 
- religious lessons ($400. OOO/yr) $ 33.33 
Acti vi ties: 
- Skiing = $100. 00/yr. $ 8. 33 
- Swim team = $480. OO/yr. $ 40. 00 
- Weight training = $6. 00/week $ 25. 80 
Clothing: $ 75. 00 
Shoes: ($300. OO/yr) $ 25. 00 
Other: 
- Grooming $ 40. 00 
- Books $ 10. 00 
- Gifts for friends ($120. OO/yr. ) $ 10. 00 
Total monthly expenses $409. 29 
*At present provided by Defendant' s father 
**Will be putting half of allowance in savings 
A-G3 
Gerber v. Gerber 
Additional Monthly Expenses for Minor Children 
NAME: David Acre: 11 Sex: Male 
(2-26-82) 
Doctor: ($250. 00 deducihle/yr. ) 
Dentist ($150. OO/yr. minimum) 
Optometrist 
* O r t h o d o n t i s t 
Dugs/prescriptions 
School lunches ($1. 25 x 5 x 4. 3) 
**Allowance 
Lessons: 
- piano 
- religious lesson ($400. OO/yr. ) 
- clarinet (rental) 
Activities: 
- skiing = $100. OO/yr 
- scouting = $175/yr 
- swim team = $480/yr 
- weight training = $6. 00/wk 
Clothing: 
Shoes ($300/yr. ) 
Other: 
- Grooming 
- Books 
- Gifts for friends ($60. OO/yr. ) 
Total monthly expenses 
$ 20. 
$ 25. 
$ 
$ -
83 
50 
•0-
$ 7. 00 
$ 21. 
$ 40. 
$ 40. 
$ 33. 
$ 15. 
$ 8. 
$ 14. 
$'40. 
$ 25. 
$ 75. 
$ 25. 
$ 15. 
$10. 
$ 5. 
$421. 
50 
00 
00 
33 
00 
33 
58 
00 
80 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
87 
*At present provided by Defendant' s father 
**Will he putting half of allowance in savings. 
A-H 
Cerber v. Gerber 
Additional Monthly Expenses for Minor Children 
NAME: Jonathan Acre: 10 Sex: Male 
(6-14-83) 
Doctor: ($250. 00/yr. deductible) 
Dentist: ($150. 00/yr minimum) 
Optometrist 
* Orthodontist 
Dru gs /pres cripti ons 
School lunches ($1. 25 x 5 x 4. 3) 
**Allowance 
Lessons: 
- piano 
- religious lessons = $400/yr. 
- band instrument rental 
Activities: 
- Skiing = $100. 00/yr. 
- Swim team = $480. OO/yr. 
- Scouting = $100. OO/yr. 
- Basketball = $ 55. OO/yr 
- Weight training = $6. 00/wk. 
Clothing: 
Shoes: ($300. OO/yr) 
Other: 
- grooming 
- books 
- gifts for friends ($60. OO/yr. ) 
Total monthly expenses 
*At present provided by Defendant' s father. 
**Will be putting half of allowance in savings. 
mb\dsd\gerber\anticipated monthly expenses 
$ 20. 
$ 12. 
83 
50 
$ ? 
$ ~ 
$ 7. 
$ 21. 
$ 40. 
$ 40. 
$ 33. 
$ 15. 
$ 8. 
S 40. 
$ 8. 
S 4. 
$ 25. 
$ 75. 
S 25. 
$15. 
S 10. 
$ 5. 
$40 7. 
•0-
00 
50 
00 
00 
33 
00 
33 
00 
33 
58 
80 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
20 
/\-(o5 
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF PENDING 
DIVORCE LITIGATION 
Child Support $ 2, 100. 00 Total (per month) $2, 100. 00 
Alimony $ 4,000, 00 Total (per month) $4,000.00 
Property Distribution: 
CUSTODY: Defendant to be awarded sole custody of three minor children. 
Plaintiff to have reasonable visitation. 
VISITATION: Plaintiff to be awarded four (4) weeks each year/each child; 
one-half of Christmas and such other times as mutually agreed upon when 
Plaintiff is in Utah with sufficient prior notice to Defendant. 
CHILD SUPPORT: (Worksheet attached) $2,100.00 reducing to $1,550.00 and 
then $1,112.00 as each child reaches the age of majority. (Exhibit "A"). 
HEALTH INSURANCE: Plaintiff to keep minor children covered through his 
place of employment. Defendant to be covered by COBRA. 
TAX EXEMPTIONS: To be awarded to Defendant. 
ALIMONY: $4,000.00/month to be reviewed when Defendant has obtained 
employment. Re-training may be necessary because of medical problem. 
HOME: Defendant to be awarded possession of the marital home until 
youngest child has reached 18. At that time it would be sold and 
Plciintiff would receive his share of equity (see attached appraisal -
Exhibit " B" . ) 
OTHER REAL PROPERTY: Bear Lake lot to Defendant and New Orleans condo no 
Plaintiff. 
VEHICLES: 1993 Mitsubishi to Plaintiff; 1993 Ford Aerostar to Defendant. 
BANK ACCOUNTS: As per attached Exhibit "CM. 
STOCKS AND SECURITIES: As per attached Exhibit •'CM . 
RETIREMENT/PENSION PLAN: As per attached Exhibit "C". 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: As divided (see attached appraisal, Exhibit M D M ) . 
OTHER PROPERTY: -0-
LIFE INSURANCE: As per attached Exhibit "C". 
- 6 -
/X-^G 
DEBTS: -0-
OTHER: -0-
ATTORNEY, S FEES: Plaintiff to pay Defendant' s attorney' s fees. 
- 7 -
A-67 
I, Mary Jo Gerber, propose the above settlement. 
If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately 
hours and 3 witnesses will be called for this party. 
6 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct. 
1l '<sV 
MARY JO/jSE^BER/Defendant 
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o be fore me t h i s /£, day of 
1993. 
iJuu//?0A»~,J& -
/ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at : rjUt tfc-As *£&£. 
NOTARY PUBLIC i 
'My Commission expires 
July to. 1994 ; 
TO s*8¥E Q?R£W8£L&k HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING 
lmURMATlUN NEUES&AUY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS 
DECLARATION, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST 
RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, 
PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS, CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER 
RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
- 8 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or empoloyed in the law firm 
of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. , 525 East First South, Suite 500, P.O. 
Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, and that in said capacity, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINANCIAL DECLARATION to 
be mailed to the person(s) named below: 
B. L. Dart, Esq. 
310 South Main Street, Ste. 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Plaint iff 
yo^^? on t h i s / V* day of _ yc~—<? , 1993. 
(mb\dsd\Gerber.Fin) 
- 9 -
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- \ " ^ 
\ \ DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899) of and for .w.-v 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South 
Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 '"' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOWELL GERBER 
vs. 
MARY J O GERBER 
P l a i n t i f f , 
D e f e n d a n t 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
WORKSHEET 
{Sole Custody and Paternity} 
C i v i l No. 924905415 
Commiss ioner Michae l S. Evans 
—oooOooo 
MOTHER FATHER COMBINED 
| l . E n t e r t h e combined number of n a t u r a l | \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ j \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ j 
] c h i l d r e n and a d o p t e d c h i l d r e n of t h i s j \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ | W W W W W j 3 
| m o t h e r and f a t h e r 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ W \ 1 W W W W W 1 
| 2 a . E n t e r t h e f a t h e r ' s and m o t h e r ' s g r o s s |$ - 0 - | $ 16 ,666 j \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 
j m o n t h l y i n c o m e . R e f e r t o i n s t r u c t i o n s | J | W X W W W W W 
j f o r d e f i n i t i o n of income I i ' W W W \ W W W 
| 2 b . E n t e r p r e v i o u s l y o r d e r e d a l i m o n y t h a t i s | - | - j W X W W W W W 
| a c t u a l l p a i d . (Do n o t e n t e r a l i m o n y j j j W X W W W W W 
! o r d e r e d f o r t h i s c a s e ) 1 ! j W X W W W W W . 
J2c . E n t e r p r e v i o u s l y o r d e r e d c h i l d s u p p o r t | - j j W X W W W W W 
| (Do n o t e n t e r o b l i g a t i o n s o r d e r e d f o r j | 1 W X W W W W W 
| t h e c h i l d r e n i n t h i s c a s e i | i W X W W W W W 
| 2 d . O p t i o n a l : E n t e r t h e amount from L i n e 12 | - | | W X W W W W W 
j of t h e C h i l d r e n I n P r e s e n t Home Work- j j j W X W W W W W 
| s h e e t f o r e i t h e r o a r e n t . 1 1 1 W X W W W W W 
j 3 . S u b s t r a c t L i n e 2b , 2 c , and 2d from 2a . |$ - 0 - | 16 ,666 j$ 16,666 
| T h i s i s t h e A d j u s t e d Mon th ly Gros s | | 1 
i G r o s s f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t p u r p o s e s . ! ! 1 
| 4 . Take t h e COMBINED f i g u r e i n L i n e 3 and | \ W \ W X X 
| t h e number of c h i l d r e n i n L i n e 1 t o t h e jWWXWX 
| S u p p o r t T a b l e . F i n d t h e Base Combined | W W W W 
1 S u p p o r t O b l i g a t i o n . IWWXXW 
iww\ww\l$ 
IWWWWWj 
IWWWWWI 
IWWWWWJ 
2 , 100 
EXHIBIT A 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly 
gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED adjusted 
montly gross in Line 3 . 
-0- 100% \\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
WWWWWXW 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each 
parent's share of the Base Support 
Obligation. . 
$ 2 , 1 0 0 . 0 0 WWWWWXW 
\wwwwww 
W W W W W X W 7. Enter the children's portion of monthly 
medical and dental insurance premiums 
paid to insurance company. 
WWWWWXW 
WWWWWXW 
W W W W W X W 
Enter the monthly work or training 
related child care expense for the 
children in Line l, 
wwww 
wwww 
wwww 
wwwww 
wwwww 
wwwww 
-0-
BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor parent. 
$2,100.00 
10. Adjusted Base Child Support Award. Subtrsct the Obligor's 
Line 7 from Line 9. 
11. Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child. Divided Line 10 
bv Line 1. _ _ _ _ _ _ 
12. CHILD CARE AWARD. 
Multiply Line 8 by .50 to obtain Obligor's share of child 
care expenses. Add Line 10 only when expense is actually 
incurred. _ _ 
$10,000.00 = $1,808.00 
$ 6,666.00 = $ 300.00 (60 x $5.00) 
-_- $2,108.00 
A-ii 
Property DgscrtpCoo A Anah/ajts 
j e r r y K . wBDoet 
UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL APPRAISAL REPORi 
J U * O i'ii_rfu-*-nnio urv. 
J l a N o R V 29 
8 
B 
J 6 
I. 
3 0 2 8 MEADOES DRIVE 
OrPARK CITY couny SUMMIT st.*. UEAHapCod. 84060 
L^o^o^on LOT 2 9 , RIDGEVIEW SUBDIVISION 
GERHER M.pw RV 29 
M T U M I 4 / 1 5 6 . 6 3 PD T«YW 1992 HOAH*) NCNE 
DAVID S. DOIOvvTTZ AND B. L. DART 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
PROP RIGHTS APPRAISED 
F M SfrnpW 
leaeehoid 
Condom*T*jr« (HUO/VA) 
Oe M M n u l PUO 
LENneR DISCRETIONARY use 
Sete Pf** | 
Oate 
Mortgega Amount | 
MoHgege T»pe 
Dteoounl Po* te and O t « r Conoeeetone 
Paid by SeWr | 
Source 
LOCATION 
B U 1 . T U P 
QrtOWTH RAT€ 
PROPERTY VALUES 
DEMAND/SUPPLY 
MARKET»«3 T W C 
PfULUHT LAND U S E % 
8«^te FemJy _ 
2-4 Famey __ 
55 
45 
|Over 7 8 % 
Rapid 
knoreaetrtg 
Shortage 
lUnder 3 M o * 
LANO U 8 e CHANGE 
N o « * e » y 
NA 8 
Suburb** 
25-78% 
Stabte 
Stmt** 
In Balance 
3-6 Mo*. 
PREDOMINANT 
OCCUPANCY 
Owner 
<0~8%» 
Veoanl (ov»x 6%) 
Rural 
Undar 2S% 
Stow 
Oecfteng 
Ov*r BuctVy 
Over 8 Mo* 
SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING 
PRICE 
• (000) 
_250_Law 
450 in* 
350 
AGE 
(r«l 
_ 2 
25 
8 
NEIGHBORHOOD ANALYSIS 
Employment Stebefty 
Convenience to Employment 
C^nventenoe to Shopceng 
Convenience to Sohoote 
Ad*<*jecy of Pubao Trenaporteaon 
Aeortaton FeUfaea 
Adequacy of U « * t e * 
Property CompeaNtry 
Proteoton from Oet tnenUJ CondMone 
Po«oe 4 r V * Pn>teoebn 
General Appearance) Ol Pret*er8*a 
Appeal to M l A > l 
N o * : Race or t w rwid oompoefaon of • neighborhood om not eonetdered retabte epprateal aeotora. 
COMMENTS A SINGLE FAMILY AREA IOCATED ABOUT 3 . 5 MILES NE OF HISTORIC PARK CITY 
IHE IMMEDIATE AREA ARE CUSTOM BUIUT. MANY HAVE BEEN BUIIiT IN THE PAST 2 
MXST HOMES IN 
PARK CITY IS A" 
YEAR ROUND RBCREATICaNAL AREA DEPENDENT UPON SKIING AND TOURISM FCR ITS BOCNCMIC BASE. AS SUCH 
YEARS. 
REAL ESTATE VALUES FLUCTUATE GREATLY. IN TOE PAST YEAR IHE RESALE MARKET HAS IMPROVED GREATLY 
8 9 . 1 0 X 1 3 1 . 2 3 X 67 X 2 4 . 6 8 X 142 .79 
<u»A*. 1 2 , 6 0 0 SQUARE FEET OR . 2 9 AC com*Lot NO 
Zon^Ctea*teaton R E S I D E N T I A L , S I N G L E F A M I L Y Zon*g Compl.no. Y E S 
HK3HE8T & BEST USE: Preaent U<* Y E S 0*er U N N D 
Eteottfty 
O M 
Water 
Sanitary 8e-*er 
8torm Oe war 
Pvbte 
m CONCRETE 
8 r r e IMPROVEMENTS Type 
S M ASFHALIT 
Corb/OulWf 
BJdeweJt 
8^tuow> INCANDESCENT 
AJtey 
CONCRETE 
Pubto 
x 
x 
NONE 
Topography 
Sir* 
8hepe 
Ocatnage 
View 
Landaoapetg 
Ottvewey 
Apparent Eaeementa 
FEMA Ptood H e a r d 
FEMA* Map/Zone 
SLOPES DCrWN TO EAST 
TYCPICAL FCR AREA 
RECTANGULAR 
AVERAGE 
GOOD 
GOOD 
CONCRETE 
TYPICAL UTIIJTY 
XX 
COMMENTS (Apparent advert* aaeement*, encroachment*, special teeeeementa, aid* areee, eto): TYPC1AL BETCT GRQUNb U r i L r r t EASEMEN1S 
DO NOT ADVERSEIEY AFFECT THE S I T E . NO SOIL OR SUB SOIL CONDITIONS ARE KNOWN TO EXIST IN THE" 
AREA THAT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT IHE SITE OR EXISTING IMPROVEMENTS. 
GENERAL DESCRIPT ION 
Una* 
Storte* 
T y p e p e V A S ) 
O e e t g n { 8 * » 
E**ng 
Propoeed 
Under C o r f u o a o n 
AgafYrt . ) 
E f fac tv Aga (Yr« ) 
ONE 
TTO 
DETACHED 
TVAD STORY 
YES 
IK) 
NO 
8 YEARS 
8 YEARS 
EXTERIOR D E S C R I P T I O N 
Foundation 
Extorter W a t t 
OCNCREIE 
FRAME 
CEDAR 
Gutter* 4 Dwnapts. 
WtaJbwTypa 
Storm 8aah 
6or»ao* 
Manufacajrtd H o u w 
FULL 
VrOOD SASH 
YES 
YES 
TYPICAL 
TYPE OONSTRUCITO 
FOUNDATION 
Slab 
Crawl 8 p * o * 
NO 
_YES__ 
FULL 
8ump Pump 
Oampnoaa 
SatOamant 
NONE 
NO EVID 
NO EVID 
NO EVID 
BASEMENT 
Ara* 8a- r \ 
% FV«n»d 
|C««ng 
W U a 
Fteor 
lOutalda Enty 
2,065 
90 
"PAINIED 
PAINTED 
CARPET 
TO EAST 
WALKOUT TO EAST 
INSULATION 
Roof _ ^ V E _ 
Ca«og A V E 
Waft* A V E 
Poor 
Nona 
A^ouacy " A V E " 
Enargy ETBdant hama* 
B C U L GLASS 
ROOMS Foyar LKV^g D»+>g Fmmty Rm Laundry 
2 ,065 
1 ,640 
5,705sou W9 Faal ol Oroaa LNtng Am a FWarwd *ra« abov* grada oootair>a: 4 Badroom(«); • ~>B*8»{t) , 
MaWnahvCcndWon 
CARPET/GOOD 
PLSTRBRD/^AINT 
T\OOD/GO0D 
CARPET/TTLE 
SatiW»i-aco< CERAMIC TILE 
VrOOO/AVER^ST 
STAINED VAOOD TRIM 
rV*p*aoa<i) "IHFRTHASOMRV; 2 
CAR STORAGE- Oarvga 
No Car* 3 C a/port 
C«^cn AVET~ N o n a B 
|HEAT1NG 
Fval 
ICondWon 
IAdequacy 
C O O U N Q 
CenTtJ 
\Ormr 
Adaquaqr 
FWA 
GAS 
AVE 
AVE 
NOME 
AVE) 
"AVE 
Attached 
[OaUohad 
[Butt In 
[KrTCHEN EQUIP 
FUMgemtar 
WaanarTOryar 
Mtorowvva) 
InWroom 
Adaouala 
inadequate 
EJactVj Door 
A^«or-te.^re, YARD 1S_ PARl'iALLY ^ ' y C i i | 
I S 8 X 2 4 . VrOOO D D d T I S ~ 4 0 ~ X 1 0 PLUS' 
ATTIC 
None 
8teto 
Drop Stair 
Scuttle 
Ftoor 
Heated < 
FWahed 
NCNE 
Itouee Entry 
Outeide E/tfry 
Baaemem Entry 
IMPROVEMENT ANALYSIS 
Qualty of Corwruoabn 
ConOhton of Irnpro'viTOenta 
Room 8toa*-l^yout 
Ctoeate end 8 b r * g * 
Energy Eiflctenoy 
P^mbaig - Adequacy 4 Condtton 
EteottoaJ . Adequacy 4 ConcNon 
K W a n Cabinet* - Adequacy 4 Conxttlon 
CompeOMty to Ne<c#*orhood 
Appeal 4 MartejtaMty 
Eeimated R e m a H n g Economkj La* 
E*»nated RerrtaUng Phyetoaf Lite 
Avg 
fX 
X 
X 
IX] 
X 
X 
40 YEARS
 Yrfc 
"45"YEAR5~Yr. 
LANL^ CAPR3 AND AU101J[nilNKIEUll). 
14 X 24". UUVEWD nun
1
 KJIOI 
"OVERALL IMPAIR AND O0NDlTTHI"lS" 
HOME wfts^jsraraunirimTr^ 
DennKte9on (Phyaicsl, iuncfloneJ and attemai kvdaquactet. rapak^ na-eded. rnodamiration, eta) 
REFLDCTIVE OF A IO<E OF 8 YEARS EFFECTIVE AGE 
UPGEADES7~lMm]X~M^^ -
GanereJ markal condtrtone and p>*v«tence and ki ipact \r* aubteclAnaffcet *r*t r»g*rdk>g loan dbwounts. tntereat buydowna and ooncerabna RESAUT0F 
EXISTING HCMES IN THE AREA HAS BEEN GOOD. IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS IHE OVERALL MAnKET"TOrTlCM!S" 
T!g"707EA~n5~lO-IES"]IAVE"BEEN"'DFFT,KiM) l-OTTSAIETmHT^rSQID DURING"I9927"AVE'PRICE"$2957209:" 
»fek*» Uma Form 70 10S6 T O T A L ' apprttaal toftwwt by a U a*o6m. kv I (900) 328 C&23 Fannte M a * I0CK i a « C 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
Attorney for Defendant 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0008 
Telephone: [801] 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOWELL GERBER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY JO GERBER, 
Defendant, 
FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Civil No. 924905415 
Date: August 10, 1994 
—oooOooo 
Husband: Lowell Gerber 
Addre s s: 
Soc. Sec. No. 
Occupation: __ 
Employer: 
350-40-2033 
Birth Date: 
Wife: Marv Jo Gerber 
Address: 
Soc. Sec. 
3 02 8 Meadows Drive 
Park Citv, Utah 84060 
No. 529-72-9417 
Occupation: Substitute teacher 
Employer: 
Birth Date 
Park Citv School Dist. 
B: 7/6/51 
NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 
5 DAYS PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO 
COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS- FORM AS REQUIRED WILL AUTHORIZE THE 
COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS 
DECISION. ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE 
PENALTY FOR PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(Note: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and 
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4 .3; If figures are on a bi-
weekly basis, multiply by 2.167) 
GROSS MONTHLY INCOME FROM: 
Salary and wages, including commissions, 
bonuses, allowances and over-time, 
payable: $1,466.46/6mnts (pay period) 
Pensions and retirement: 
Social Security: 
Disability and unemployment insurance: 
Public Assistance (welfare, AFDC pay-
ments, etc.): 
Child support 
Dividends and interest: 
Rents: 
All other sources (specify) (alimony) 
HUSBAND WIFE 
244.41 
2,100.00 
4,000.00 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME: 
ITEMIZE MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS 
INCOME: 
State and federal income taxes: 
(State, $2,400/vr. Federal, $4,800/vr 
Number of exemptions taken: 
Social Security: 
Medical or other insurance (describe 
fully): 
Union or other dues: 
Retirement or pension funds: 
Savinas Plan: 
Credit Union: 
Other (specify): 
$1,466.46 Fed. 
On aross 
. Tax 
$880; FICA $112.18, 
$20 .79 . 
= $3 
pay 
i.80; 
over 6 
of 
: State 
months = 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS: 
NET MONTHLY INCOME - TAKE HOME PAY: 
- 2 -
6,344.41 
600.00 
4 
20.79 
620.79 
5,723.62 
A -i*) 
4 . DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: 
Creditor's Name 
G.E. Capital 
For 
1st Mortgage 
Date 
Payable 
10th Month 
Monthly 
Balance Payment 
$198,628 Sl.735)PIT) 
TOTAL: $1,735.00 
ALL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES know to me owned individually or 
jointly (indicated who holds or how title held: (H) Husband, (W) 
Wife, or (J) Jointly). WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE 
INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE. 
OWED 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances, and equipment: 
Automobile (Year-Make) 
Securities - stocks, bonds: 
Cash and deposit accounts (banks, 
savings & loans, credit unions -
savings & checking: 
VALUE THEREON 
(e) Life Insurance 
Name of Company 
Policy 
No. Face Amt. 
None 
(f) Profit Sharing or 
Retirement Accounts 
Cash Value, accumulated 
dividend, or loan amt. 
Value of Interest and Amount 
Presently Vested 
Name : 
Name: 
- 3 
fi-1* 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (Specify) 
Bear Lake Lot = $10,000.00 
(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, 
attach sheet with identical information for all additional 
property): 
Address: 
Original Cost: 
Cost of Additions: 
Total Cost: 
Mtg, Balance: 
Other Liens: 
Equity: 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Monthly Amortization $ 
Taxes: $ 
Individual Contributions: 
Type of Property: 
Date of Acquisition: 
Total Present Value: $. 
Basis for Valuation: 
And to Whom: 
(i) Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business, 
value less indebtedness): 
- "None 
(j) Other Assets (Specify): 
None 
- 4 -
6. TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES: *(Specify which party is the custodial 
parent and list names and relationship of all members of the 
household whose expenses are included) 
Rent or Mortgage Payments (residence) (PIT) 1,735.00 
Real property taxes (residence) -0-
Real property insurance (residence) -0-
Maintenance (residence) 150.00 
Food and household supplies 900.00 
Utilities inc. water, electricity, gas & heat 239.00 
Telephone 60.00 
Laundry and cleaning 20.00 
Clothing (Def. and 3 children) 225.00 
Medical (Def. and 3 children-uninsured portion) 50.00 
Dental -0-
Insurance ( Health ins, premium Plaintiff and 3 
children) 186.00* 
School(Jewish Religious lessons for 3 minor 
children = $l,000/vr) 85.00 
Entertainment (eat out, allowances, movies, video 
rentals, books and any and all misc. expenses for 
Defendant and 3 minor children) 470.00 
Incidentals (swim meets. Boy Scout camps. 
travel and other activities for 3 minor children) 450.00 
Grooming, gifts (X-mas & Birthdays, donations, 125.00 
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance, taxes, 
and registration) 300.00 
Other expenses 
Income taxes <600.00> 
Professional Fees (Board exams & trying 
to find employment. 100.00 
Veterinary expenses ($262/yr) 22.00 
Accounting and Legal Fees 600.00 
Computer repairs, supplies, updating 200.00 
TOTAL EXPENSES: 5,817.00 
*Premium for 3 children = $90.00/month Plaintiff was ordered to 
pay. He has not paid (10 x $90 = $900). 
5 
A-"*n 
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF PENDING 
DIVORCE LITIGATION 
Child Support $ 2,100.00 
Alimony $ 4 , 000.00 
Property Distribution: 
1. In the Decree of Divorce entered November, 1993, Defendant was awarded 
$4,000/month alimony based on the financial circumstances of the parties. 
This was to be reviewed in 12 months, i.e., November, 1994 or earlier if 
circumstances warranted such a review. Defendant was to use her best 
efforts to seek and obtain employment. Defendant suffered damage in 
February, 1993 to her right thumb and it is anticipated that she will not 
be able to resume her career as a dental hygienist. Defendant took her 
dental hygiene board examinations in June of 1994 for her licensing but 
failed to pass due to her inability to properly "fee" on the scaling 
of teeth. Defendant has lost sensitivity and dexterity in her thumb and 
it is unlikely to improve beyond her present capabilities even after more 
than a full year of physical therapy. Defendant has been doing substitute 
teaching in the Park City School District and is paid $40.00/day. 
2. Plaintiff claims that he is unable to continue to pay alimony in the 
amount of $4,000.00 since he is now required to pay $800.00 per month in 
disability premiums and he did not anticipate that the cost of housing in 
Florida would be as high as he is now paying. Plaintiff's salary, 
however, still remains at $200,000.00 per year, the same rate he was 
receiving when he was ordered to pay $4,000/month alimony. 
3. Defendant will be unable to resume employment as a dental hygienist 
because of the injury to her hand. Defendant is seeking to increase the 
number of days of substitute teaching until she can obtain a "full time" 
teaching position and therefore alimony should continue until Defendant 
has obtained such a position. 
4. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's attorney's fees of 
$2,83 9.28 (approx.) incurred in having to respond to his Petition to 
Modify. 
GRAND TOTAL PER MONTH: 
I, MARY JO GERBER, propose the above settlement 
.BER 
- 6 -
Total (per month) $ 2,100 . 00 
Total (per month) $ 4,000.00 
m 
MARY Jp 
If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately 3 
hours and ^? witnesses will be called for this party. 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7 day of /y/taxof. 
1994. 
f 
NOTAJ^ PUBLIC , , . , , * , , , , - . 
Residing a t : J&£CC&Z/Ct ^ ^ £ ^ C 
1
 -"~— NOTARY PUBLIC ' 
Mary A. O'Donnell 
1087 E. Country Woods Cir tA 
Midvgle, Utah 84047 
My Commission Expires 
July 10, 1996 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING - ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING 
INFORMATION NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS 
DECLARATION, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST 
RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, 
PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS, CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER 
RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
- 7 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or empoloyed in the law firm 
of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. , 525 East First South, Suite* 500, P.O. 
Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, and that in said capacity, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINANCIAL DECLARATION to 
be mailed to the person(s) named below: 
B. L. Dart, Esq. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main, Ste. 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
•pf 
on this I *~ day of ^yCcc^^^^^f , 1994. 
(mb\dsd\Gerber .Fin) 
- 8 -
